Application Preview

Application number: 1-1814-82061 for Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited

Generated on 11 06 2012


Applicant Information


1. Full legal name

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited

2. Address of the principal place of business

ANZ Centre Melbourne, Level 9, 833 Collins St
Docklands Victoria 3008
AU

3. Phone number

+61 3 9273 5555

4. Fax number

+61 3 8654 1922

5. If applicable, website or URL

http:⁄⁄www.anz.com

Primary Contact


6(a). Name

Wing Hong Cheung

6(b). Title

Group Senior Manager Digital Marketing, Group Marketing

6(c). Address


6(d). Phone Number

+61 3 86554711

6(e). Fax Number


6(f). Email Address

[email protected]

Secondary Contact


7(a). Name

Mr. Christopher John Charlton

7(b). Title

Senior IP Lawyer

7(c). Address


7(d). Phone Number

+61 3 8654 8517

7(e). Fax Number

+61 3 8654 1922

7(f). Email Address

[email protected]

Proof of Legal Establishment


8(a). Legal form of the Applicant

Publicly listed and traded company

8(b). State the specific national or other jursidiction that defines the type of entity identified in 8(a).

Australia

8(c). Attach evidence of the applicant's establishment.

Not Available

9(a). If applying company is publicly traded, provide the exchange and symbol.

Australian_Securities_Exchange

9(b). If the applying entity is a subsidiary, provide the parent company.


9(c). If the applying entity is a joint venture, list all joint venture partners.


Applicant Background


11(a). Name(s) and position(s) of all directors

Alison Mary WatkinsIndependent Non-Executive Director
David Edward MeiklejohnIndependent Non-Executive Director
Gregory John ClarkIndependent Non-Executive Director
Hsien Yang LeeIndependent Non-Executive Director
Ian John MacfarlaneIndependent Non-Executive Director
John Powell MorschelChairman
Michael Roger Pearson SmithChief Executive Officer
Peter Algernon Franc HayIndependent Non-Executive Director

11(b). Name(s) and position(s) of all officers and partners

Alexander Vincent ThursbyChief Executive Officer, Asia Pacific, Europe & America
Alistair CurrieChief Operating Officer
David Duncan HiscoChief Executive Officer, ANZ New Zealand
Graham Kennedy HodgesDeputy Chief Executive Officer
Jacqueline Anne WeatherstonChief Information Officer
Joyce Ann PhillipsGroup Managing Director, Strategy, Mergers & Acquisitions, Marketing and Innovation
Nigel Henry Murray WilliamsChief Risk Officer
Peter Ralph MarriottChief Financial Officer
Philip Wayne ChronicanChief Executive Officer, Australia
Shayne Cary ElliottChief Executive Officer, Institutional
Susan Rebecca BabaniGroup Managing Director, Human Resources

11(c). Name(s) and position(s) of all shareholders holding at least 15% of shares

HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) LimitedNot Applicable

11(d). For an applying entity that does not have directors, officers, partners, or shareholders: Name(s) and position(s) of all individuals having legal or executive responsibility


Applied-for gTLD string


13. Provide the applied-for gTLD string. If an IDN, provide the U-label.

anz

14(a). If an IDN, provide the A-label (beginning with "xn--").


14(b). If an IDN, provide the meaning or restatement of the string in English, that is, a description of the literal meaning of the string in the opinion of the applicant.


14(c). If an IDN, provide the language of the label (in English).


14(c). If an IDN, provide the language of the label (as referenced by ISO-639-1).


14(d). If an IDN, provide the script of the label (in English).


14(d). If an IDN, provide the script of the label (as referenced by ISO 15924).


14(e). If an IDN, list all code points contained in the U-label according to Unicode form.


15(a). If an IDN, Attach IDN Tables for the proposed registry.

Not Available

15(b). Describe the process used for development of the IDN tables submitted, including consultations and sources used.


15(c). List any variant strings to the applied-for gTLD string according to the relevant IDN tables.


16. Describe the applicant's efforts to ensure that there are no known operational or rendering problems concerning the applied-for gTLD string. If such issues are known, describe steps that will be taken to mitigate these issues in software and other applications.

The .anz string and A-Label were developed in line with and checked against the eligibility, stability and policy criteria as stated in the ICANN Applicant Guidebook - version 2012-01-11. The results of those checks are as follows:

	- The string has less than 63 characters;

	- The string in ASCII is composed of three or more visually distinct characters;

	- The ASCII label consists entirely of letters;

	- The string is not a reserved name as shown in section 2.2.1.2.1 - Reserved Names of the ICANN Applicant Guidebook - version 2012-01-11; and

	- .anz is not identical or similar to any of the top 10 invalid TLD’s responsible for the majority of DNS pollution, as referenced in the Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC)’s report on this topic at http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄committees⁄security⁄sac045.pdf. It is likely that the .anz has not already been queried with meaningful frequency at the root. Therefore, it is unlikely that .anz will inherit significant invalid query traffic.


Due to the positive results of these checks, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited does not believe that the .anz gTLD will be subject to any operational or rendering problems.

17. (OPTIONAL) Provide a representation of the label according to the International Phonetic Alphabet (http://www.langsci.ucl.ac.uk/ipa/).


Mission/Purpose


18(a). Describe the mission/purpose of your proposed gTLD.

THE MISSION AND PURPOSE OF THE NEW RESTRICTED .ANZ gTLD IS TO BENEFIT INTERNET USERS BY ENSURING INCREASED TRUST AND CONFIDENCE THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF USER CONFUSION AND ASSURANCE OF BRAND AUTHENTICITY.

The new .anz gTLD will operate as a restricted registry, in which Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ) can create and control domain spaces that promote its brand identity and authenticity. .anz will be used by ANZ, its affiliates and partners that are associated with the ANZ brand to provide authoritative information and resources regarding ANZ’s banking and financial products and services to consumers in a way that promotes trust, confidence and convenience. Second and third level domains can then be utilised for online banking, specific product pages and for marketing purposes, with internet users assured of brand authenticity.

ANZ is one of Australia’s leading providers of banking and financial products and services including retail, commercial, global institutional, private banking, investments, insurance and superannuation. ANZ’s proud history dates back 175 years when the Bank of Australasia opened its first offices in Sydney and Melbourne, the latter of which has remained ANZ’s global headquarters to this day. Today ANZ operates in 32 countries around the world with a particularly strong presence in the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region. ANZ is Australia’s third largest bank and is one of the top 25 largest banks in the world with a market capitalisation of approximately AUD60 billion. Listed on the Australian Stock Exchange under the ANZ code, ANZ had 2011 revenue of AUD36 billion, eight million customers and 48,000 employees worldwide. In 2010, ANZ was assessed as the world’s most sustainable bank by the Dow Jones Sustainability Index for the fourth consecutive year. ANZ launched its online banking website, anz.com, in 1996, which now has millions of internet banking customers, and its innovative iPhone banking application in 2008. In this regard, brand protection, consumer trust and continuous innovation are paramount considerations in all its activities. .anz will promote ANZ as an innovative, forward-thinking bank, provide improved user navigation and enhance consumer trust in ANZ’s online brand by providing a secure and authentic online banking environment.

Business activities are increasingly conducted over the internet, allowing for greater levels of interaction between businesses and customers. As a result, both businesses and end users benefit from ease of interaction and a wider range of choices with lower transaction costs. However, the development in this arena in the current domain name system has exposed both businesses and consumers to increased criminal activities over the internet, including data breach, hacking and phishing. These sophisticated criminal activities cause reputational damage to businesses as internet users lose consumer confidence and trust with the businesses targeted by such criminal activities. .anz will facilitate greater trust and assurance from internet users connecting with ANZ online, whilst still allowing convenient and efficient interaction.

ANZ’s mission and purpose of the proposed gTLD share ICANN’s initiatives to promote public interest. ANZ is committed to contribute towards achieving such initiatives in line with ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments, which includes:
- consumer trust: .anz will be operated in a centralised manner with a restrictive registration policy. Registration of domain names will only be available to ANZ and its affiliates, at this stage, which will provide added consumer trust that .anz domain names are trustworthy. As .anz domain names are subject to registration standards, policies and procedures under ANZ’s control, this eliminates the possibility of malicious conduct within .anz;
- competition: the gTLD is not intended to instigate competition and consumer choice at the level of registration of domain names among prospective registrants. Instead it is anticipated to contribute to ICANN’s initiatives to promote public interest through its operation focused on promoting consumer trust. Increased trust in .anz will drive existing and new top level domain (TLD) registry operators to make improvements in mechanisms to improve consumer trust of their TLDs; and
- consumer choice: the gTLD will enable user-driven improvements and innovations assisting ANZ’s marketing efforts through its ability to create new second and third level domain names on demand. These names will provide the consumers with more choices for interacting with ANZ. As ANZ has effective control over the registration and use of domain names under .anz, this will also contribute towards general service innovations on the internet.

Given the restricted nature of .anz, the projected number of registrations is likely to be limited with about 5 to 15 domain names registered in the first three years. However, this number is likely to increase as ANZ implements new banking and financial products and services and marketing campaigns.

As the .anz gTLD expands, ANZ will continue to comply with all operational, technical and policy requirements, as well as maintaining consumer trust and the stability of the internet. ANZ will keep ICANN reasonably informed of any material developments relating to .anz including compliance with the continued operations instrument obligations as set out in Specification 8 of the Registry Agreement.

ANZ intends to create domain names for online banking, products, services and geographic names at the second or third level. In accordance with registration policy and the proposed measures for protection of geographic names as outlined in response to Question 22, ANZ will use geographic names to localise its websites in countries in which it operates. It is anticipated that the number of geographic names used at the second level will increase as ANZ expands internationally. The use of geographic names is intended to:
- connect internet users with relevant information as applicable to the territory;
- provide seamless user navigation across ANZ’s geographic markets; and
- comply with required rules and regulations in the national territory.
At this stage, ANZ does not intend to utilise Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) at the second level. However, as the use of the .anz gTLD evolves, ANZ may wish to utilise IDNs within the .anz domain space to allow internet users to engage with .anz in their native language, creating a more positive user experience and encouraging diversity.

ANZ is a well-recognised global brand with its “ANZ” trademark registered in 24 countries and territories, including Australia, India, EU and UK, and pending or accepted trademark applications in a further seven countries, for classes including: Insurance and financial services including banking (36) and Advertising and business services (35).

ANZ has an extensive domain portfolio including domain names with an exact match to the “ANZ” trademark and applied-for .anz string in the following spaces:
gTLDs: anz.asia, anz.com, anz.info, anz.jobs and anz.mobi
ccTLDs: anz.com.au, anz.net.au, anz.as, anz.cm, anz.co.,anz.co.kr, anz.co.nz, anz.co.th, anz.com.fj, anz.com.ki, abz.com.pg, anz.com.ph, anz.com.sb, anz.com.sg, anz.com.tl, anz.hk, anz.in, anz.jp, anz.ki, anz.kr, anz.la, anz.my, anz.net.ck, anz.net.sb, anz.ph, anz.sg, anz.tel, anz.tl, anz.to, anz.tw, anz.us and anz.ws.
ANZ also has nearly 600 existing gTLDs and ccTLDs containing the “ANZ” trademark.

ANZ believes that .anz is unlikely to cause confusion with either a generic term or any existing TLDs. ANZ trademarks are a leading global brand with significant reputation in the Asia-Pacific region. ANZ has used the term ANZ in conjunction with its banking businesses for over 60 years. As such, the ANZ brand is well known for providing customer-focused, socially responsible banking and financial services.

18(b). How proposed gTLD will benefit registrants, Internet users, and others

18(B)I. WHAT IS THE GOAL OF YOUR PROPOSED gTLD IN TERMS OF AREAS OF SPECIALTY, SERVICE LEVELS OR REPUTATION?

The key goals of the proposed new .anz gTLD are in line with ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments: to promote consumer trust, competition and consumer choice. ANZ also seeks to foster its online reputation and provide an authoritative internet space through which ANZ is able to communicate with its customers directly and effectively. The .anz gTLD will enhance ANZ’s online brand reputation by providing secure and authentic online banking and connecting its customers across the region. The ability to create domain names on demand related to specialty product and service development and specific marketing supports these goals. Strengthened security measures, service levels and more effective functionality will provide a trusted and positive user experience.


18(B)II. WHAT DO YOU ANTICIPATE YOUR PROPOSED gTLD WILL ADD TO THE CURRENT SPACE, IN TERMS OF COMPETITION, DIFFERENTIATION, OR INNOVATION?

It is anticipated that the proposed .anz gTLD will make positive contributions to the wider internet community by providing:


DIFFERENTIATION (INCREASED TRUST):

The .anz gTLD will simplify how internet users interact with ANZ by providing a distinctive domain space. Internet users will be able to directly navigate to the .anz gTLD site, saving time and resources searching for an official site. The current domain name system has shown that it is vulnerable to malicious abuses due to registration of domain names which seek to exploit consumer confusion. This is particularly important to a bank such as ANZ where consumer trust in its online brand depends on ANZ’s ability to provide safe, secure and authentic internet banking websites and applications. ANZ can address some of these vulnerabilities by maintaining complete control over the domain names registered under the .anz domain space. The new .anz gTLD will allow to create a trusted global homepage and authentic, memorable second and third level domain names under .anz for its banking and financial products which are consistent across ANZ’s geographic markets. This will also reduce the risk of customers being deceived by phishing websites. Together with consumer trust, internet users will be able to rely on the authoritativeness of the domain names under .anz domain space, which will differentiate interaction between internet users and ANZ.


COMPETITION:

The differentiation of .anz gTLD as a trusted site for ANZ will drive existing and new TLD registry operators to make improvements in mechanisms to improve consumer trust of their TLDs. Internet users will be encouraged to interact with domain names under .anz domain space. As a result, .anz will have a flow on effect to enable increased competition. Therefore, the benefits of the proposed .anz will be distributed not only to its direct customers, but to the internet community at large forcing improved services and competitive pricing in the market place.


INNOVATION:

With the expansion of the internet community to all corners of the world, the existing TLD structure presents limitations, not only in the availability of domain names for registrants, but also to businesses and organisations establishing a coherent global online brand presence to meet their evolving business needs. It is often difficult to register a domain name in existing domain space due to unavailability of the desired name. Even when the desired domain name is available, it may come with a high price tag associated with a purchase of such desired name from a third party. Global online brand coherence is particularly important for ANZ which provides a range of banking and financial products and services to large corporate and private banking customers operating across many different countries. The .anz domain space will allow ANZ to create second level domain names for its banking products and services that are consistent across geographic markets, providing seamless navigation for customers. It is also important to have consistency in domain names for online banking in the era of rapidly advancing technology where consumer protection and trust is critical. The .anz gTLD will allow more trusted, convenient and innovative transaction opportunities for customers interacting with ANZ online and on mobile devices. ANZ has the ability to create second or third level domain names on demand, including the use of online and mobile banking, products and services, geographic names and potentially IDNs, which are relevant to its growing customer base. ANZ will be able to combine its use of the domain space with innovative user focused marketing and services to address the currently unmet needs in the existing domain name system providing greater consumer choice.


18(B)III. WHAT GOALS DOES YOUR PROPOSED gTLD HAVE IN TERMS OF USER EXPERIENCE?

The proposed .anz will provide a positive user experience, which meets the changing and growing needs of the global internet community. ANZ will maintain control in the registration and use of domain names and will ensure that the new gTLD will only be used for purposes authorised by ANZ. Therefore, the .anz gTLD will:

- create a trusted and intuitive global homepage for internet users accessing ANZ online and on mobile devices;

- provide greater online trust and confidence for customers when accessing authentic and secure internet banking websites and applications under the .anz domain space;

- provide improved search functions and seamless navigation across ANZ’s geographic markets and products;

- strengthen brand reputation and user confidence by enhancing security and eliminating user confusion;

- provide shorter and more memorable domain names for customers, reducing the likelihood of phishing attacks from fraudulent websites;

- direct internet users to relevant information in a timely manner by creating domain names on demand;

- use geographic names to localise its websites to connect with internet users in the relevant regions and to comply with local laws;

- potentially use IDNs to enable customer to interact directly in their native language;

- enhance security and minimise security risks by implementing necessary technical and policy measures; and

- prevent potential abuses in the registration process reducing overall costs to businesses and users.


The new .anz gTLD should address the concerns that the current domain name system is open to potential malicious abuse and user confusion in the registration processes. Although the current system allows an eligible party to lodge a claim through existing Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) or other dispute resolution processes, the .anz gTLD will reduce potential abuses in the registration processes and overall costs to internet users. User confidence in the domain name system will be strengthened, which will ultimately contribute towards promoting ICANN’s core values in benefiting the public interest.


18(B)IV. PROVIDE A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF THE APPLICANTʹS INTENDED REGISTRATION POLICIES IN SUPPORT OF THE GOALS LISTED ABOVE.

The proposed registration policy is attached in response to Question 28.

Only affiliate entities of ANZ will be eligible to register domain names in .anz at this stage. The domain name registration processes will address the requirements mandated by ICANN, including rights abuse prevention measures.


18(B)V. WILL YOUR PROPOSED gTLD IMPOSE ANY MEASURES FOR PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF REGISTRANTS OR USERS? IF SO, PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY SUCH MEASURES.

ANZ is committed to protection of privacy and confidential information in accordance with its objective of increasing consumer trust and providing a safe and legitimate internet space for internet users. Privacy and confidential information will be protected in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations relating to internet security, privacy and user’s confidential information, including the Privacy Act 1998 (Australia), which contains laws specific to credit providers such as ANZ, and the National Privacy Principles (Australia).

ANZ also has implemented its own privacy policy to demonstrate its commitment to the protection of user privacy and confidential information. As a banking and financial services organisation, ANZ has a long history of handling personal information confidentially. Protecting the privacy and confidentiality of customers’ personal information is fundamental to the way ANZ does business and ANZ takes very seriously the ongoing trust customers place in ANZ to protect their personal information. As such, ANZ has systems and procedures in place to protect customers’ personal information whenever ANZ collects, stores, uses or discloses personal information. In particular, ANZ’s Privacy Policy provides that it will only use customers’ personal information to:

- assist in providing information about products or services;

- consider customers’ requests for products or services and enable ANZ to provide those products or services;

- provide information about other ANZ products or services that may be of interest to customers;

- assist in arrangements with other organisations, such as loyalty partners, in relation to the promotion and provision of products or services;

- perform other administrative and operational tasks, including risk management, credit scoring and customer satisfaction research;

- prevent or investigate any suspected or actual fraud or crime; and

- comply with relevant laws, regulations, codes and external payment systems.


ANZ may disclose information to third parties who have been contracted by ANZ to perform certain administrative functions, such as a mailing house contracted to mail account statements to customers. ANZ expressly prohibits these third parties from using customers’ personal information except for the specific purpose for which it was supplied by ANZ.

As the .anz gTLD will only be available to affiliate entities of ANZ, initially, the amount of personal data that will be collected for the purposes of operating the gTLD and made publicly available in the WHOIS database will be very limited. ANZ will provide a publicly available and searchable WHOIS look up facility, where information about the domain name status, registrant information including administrative and technical contact details can be found in accordance with Specification 4 of the Registry Agreement. In order to prevent misuse of the WHOIS look up facility, ANZ will utilise measures including a requirement where any person submitting a WHOIS database query is required to read and agree to the terms and conditions in accordance with the registration policy. This will include the terms of use that the WHOIS database is provided for information purposes only and that the user agrees not to use the information for any other purposes such as allowing or enabling the transmission of unsolicited commercial advertising or other communication.

ANZ will deploy Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) which is intended to benefit both ANZ and its users interacting with ANZ online. DNSSEC provides additional security by validating information in the transmission, therefore it is intended to benefit those who publish information in the domain name system (DNS) and the users who retrieve information from the new .anz gTLD. ANZ already implements measures to protect privacy or confidential information of its users against misuse, loss, alteration and unauthorised access. Such measures include the use of firewalls, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) for data encryption and identification codes and passwords to control access to computer systems.
ANZ will continue to apply all security measures currently implemented and will comply with all other policies and practices required by ICANN in the Registry Agreement and any relevant Consensus Policy for protecting the privacy and confidential information of registrants and users in the new .anz domain space.


18(B)VI. DESCRIBE WHETHER AND IN WHAT WAYS OUTREACH AND COMMUNICATIONS WILL HELP TO ACHIEVE YOUR PROJECTED BENEFITS.

The proposed new .anz gTLD will be publicised by a range of advertising and marketing activities to promote recognition of the new gTLD within the internet community to be a trusted site and as a sign of authenticity. These activities will, amongst other things, include:

- embedding use of the .anz gTLD into ANZ’s overall marketing, with significant creative and media spend (over AUD 80 million globally); and

- updating existing marketing collateral, such as print brochures, letterhead materials and website call to actions.


During the initial stage of the operation of the proposed new gTLD, it is anticipated that internet users will be re-directed to current websites. However, over time, it is foreseen that communication to the internet community of the existence of the proposed new gTLD and encouragement to utilise the trusted site will contribute towards minimising malicious abuses and protecting internet users.

18(c). Describe operating rules to eliminate or minimize social costs or financial resource costs, various types of consumer vulnerabilities.

As a restricted gTLD, registration will only be open to internal users (affiliate entities) at this stage and no third parties will be able to register domain names under .anz domain space. Therefore, it is not anticipated that third party trademark owners will incur costs in relation to the .anz gTLD. The affiliate entities wishing to register domain names must ensure that all the policy requirements for registration are satisfied. ANZ will utilise the services of the proposed Trademark Clearinghouse to ensure that domain names registered and the use of those domain names, do not infringe any registered third party intellectual property rights.

No unaffiliated third party will be permitted to register domain names at this stage. It is estimated that time and money spent by consumers who have been targeted by malicious abuse in utilising services on the internet will reduce over time as a result of the new, trusted .anz gTLD.


18(C)I. HOW WILL MULTIPLE APPLICATIONS FOR A PARTICULAR DOMAIN NAME BE RESOLVED, FOR EXAMPLE, BY AUCTION OR ON A FIRST-COME⁄FIRST-SERVE BASIS?

The initial use of the proposed new gTLD will be restricted to internal business use and ANZ and affiliate entities are intended to be the registrants under the .anz gTLD. Therefore conflicts between multiple applications are not anticipated to occur.


18(C)II. EXPLAIN ANY COST BENEFITS FOR REGISTRANTS YOU INTEND TO IMPLEMENT (E.G., ADVANTAGEOUS PRICING, INTRODUCTORY DISCOUNTS, BULK REGISTRATION DISCOUNTS).

This gTLD will be used for internal purposes only, at this stage, so pricing incentives are not applicable or relevant.


18(C)III. NOTE THAT THE REGISTRY AGREEMENT REQUIRES THAT REGISTRARS BE OFFERED THE OPTION TO OBTAIN INITIAL DOMAIN NAME REGISTRATIONS FOR PERIODS OF ONE TO TEN YEARS AT THE DISCRETION OF THE REGISTRAR, BUT NO GREATER THAN TEN YEARS. ADDITIONALLY, THE REGISTRY AGREEMENT REQUIRES ADVANCE WRITTEN NOTICE OF PRICE INCREASES. DO YOU INTEND TO MAKE CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS TO REGISTRANTS REGARDING THE MAGNITUDE OF PRICE ESCALATION? IF SO, PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR PLAN.

This gTLD will be used for internal purposes only, at this stage, so pricing incentives or pricing increases are not applicable or relevant as no additional fees are to be charged.

Community-based Designation


19. Is the application for a community-based TLD?

No

20(a). Provide the name and full description of the community that the applicant is committing to serve.


20(b). Explain the applicant's relationship to the community identified in 20(a).


20(c). Provide a description of the community-based purpose of the applied-for gTLD.


20(d). Explain the relationship between the applied-for gTLD string and the community identified in 20(a).


20(e). Provide a description of the applicant's intended registration policies in support of the community-based purpose of the applied-for gTLD.


20(f). Attach any written endorsements from institutions/groups representative of the community identified in 20(a).

Not Available

Geographic Names


21(a). Is the application for a geographic name?

No

Protection of Geographic Names


22. Describe proposed measures for protection of geographic names at the second and other levels in the applied-for gTLD.

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ) generally respects and abides by the Governmental Advisory Committee’s Principles regarding New gTLDs, dated March 28, 2007.  In particular, ANZ adheres to and⁄or intends to adhere to the recommendations directed towards new registry operators in Sections 2.1, 2.4, 2.7(b). On the other hand, ANZ assumes that several of the recommendations directed towards new registry operators, in general, are less applicable in the case of Single-Registrant operational models such as .anz than in an completely open Registry model. These include without limitation Sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.7(a) and 2.9. 

In order to comply with the requirements of the Registry Agreement, Specification 5, and as with all other domains in the .anz gTLD, all Two-character labels (§2) and Country and Territory Names (§5) will be initially reserved.  However, ANZ believes that the use of geographic terms can provide great benefit and simplicity to internet users because these terms are intuitive ways to resolve to ANZ’s content that is specifically relevant and targeted to users in the particular geographic region and in line with local customs, laws and regulations.  The use of the geographic terms will be valuable to internet users because they can be reassured that the content that they are viewing is relevant to their local situation thus mitigating the risk of unnecessary user confusion.

ANZ intends to use any Two-character label and⁄or Country or Territory Name domains in ANZ’s discretion, and to participate in or implement a process by which any Government may reasonably object to that use. ANZ envisions a number of possible scenarios for ensuring Government agreement to the use of Country and Territory names. These will be explored in detail with ICANN and the Governmental Advisory Committee to ensure a mutually agreeable solution. Scenarios range from at a minimum; ANZ informing the Chair of the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) to ICANN in writing of its proposed use of geographic terms and provide Governments who wish to do so with an opportunity to block the use of their relevant name in the .anz gTLD.  Other plausible scenarios would include;


SCENARIO 1 (LETTER TO GAC)

In advance of any use of geographical names ANZ will send a letter to the chair of the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) informing the GAC of its intention to use geographical names in the .anz gTLD.  The letter will outline the reasons for using ​geographical names and provide Governments with the opportunity to contact ANZ within 90 days to reserve their respective geographical name from use in the .anz gTLD. Should a Government inform ANZ that it wishes to reserve the use of their respective geographical name, the name will remain reserved for the duration of ANZ’s registry agreement with ICANN. The opportunity to reserve a name will be offered to Governments free of charge.


SCENARIO 2 (LETTER INFORMING INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS)

In advance of any use of geographical names ANZ will send a letter to the Government concerned and inform it of ANZ’s intention to use geographical names in the .anz gTLD.  The letter will outline the reasons for using geographical names and provide the Government with the opportunity to contact ANZ within 90 days to reserve its respective geographical name from use in the .anz gTLD. Should the Government inform ANZ that it wishes to reserve the use of its respective geographical name, the name will remain reserved for the duration of ANZ’s registry agreement with ICANN. The opportunity to reserve a name will be offered to the Government free of charge.


SCENARIO 3 (LETTER REQUESTING PERMISSION FROM INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT)

In advance of any use of geographical names ANZ will send a letter to the Government concerned and inform it of ANZ’s intention to use geographical names in the .anz gTLD.  The letter will outline the reasons for using geographical names and request the Government’s approval or non-objection to the proposed use of the geographical name. Should the Government not respond to the ANZ within 90 days, ANZ will understand this to mean that the Government does not object to ANZ’s proposed use of the geographical name.  However should the Government at a later stage contact ANZ and request that the geographical name no longer be used, ANZ will work in good faith with the Government to try to find a mutually agreeable solution.

Alternatively: However should the Government at a later stage contact ANZ and request that the geographical name no longer be used, ANZ will work in good faith with the Government to try to find a mutually agreeable solution. If such a solution cannot be found ANZ will respect the Government’s wishes and reserve the name from use without cost to the Government concerned.

Generally, it is extremely unlikely that ANZ’s tightly controlled use of any cc.anz or countryname.anz domain name could be confusing or detrimental to users, or otherwise offensive to any country. Nor is it likely to be detrimental to the operator of a country ​code top level domain.  To the extent that use of any .anz domain was ever deemed confusing or offensive, ANZ has a strong desire to resolve the situation quickly and respectfully to any affected Government’s sovereign interests.  ANZ will ensure that its designated abuse contact is aware of the additional sensitivities that may potentially arise with respect to use of cc.anz or countryname.anz domains, such that any complaints of this nature are prioritized accordingly.  ANZ will not use geographic names until ICANN has approved such use.

Registry Services


23. Provide name and full description of all the Registry Services to be provided.

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ʺANZʺ, “we”, ”our” or “us”) has engaged Melbourne IT Limited and its affiliate entities (Melbourne IT) as a service provider to assist ANZ with this application and on-going management of its .anz gTLD, should this application be successful. Melbourne IT’s managed services incorporate the management and oversight of our selected back end registry services provider, ARI Registry Services, as well as other third party service providers. 

We have engaged ARI Registry Services (ARI) to deliver services for this TLD. This response describes the registry services for our TLD, as provided by ARI.



1 INTRODUCTION

ARI’s Managed TLD Registry Service is a complete offering, providing all of the required registry services. What follows is a description of each of those services.



2 REGISTRY SERVICES
The following sections describe the registry services provided. Each of these services has, where required, been designed to take into account the requirements of consensus policies as documented here:
[http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄resources⁄Registrars⁄consensus-policies]
At the time of delegation into the root this TLD will not be offering any unique Registry services.


2.1 RECEIPT OF DATA FROM REGISTRARS

The day-to-day functions of the registry, as perceived by Internet users, involves the receipt of data from Registrars and making the necessary changes to the SRS database. Functionality such as the creation, renewal and deletion of domains by Registrars, on behalf of registrants, is provided by two separate systems:
– An open protocol-based provisioning system commonly used by Registrars with automated domain management functionality within their own systems.
– A dedicated website providing the same functionality for user interaction.
Registrants (or prospective registrants) who wish to manage their existing domains or credentials, register new domains or delete their domains will have their requests carried out by Registrars using one of the two systems described below.

ARI operates Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) server software and distributes applicable toolkits to facilitate the receipt of data from Registrars in a common format. EPP offers a common protocol for Registrars to interact with SRS data and is favoured for automating such interaction in the Registrar’s systems. In addition to the EPP server, Registrars have the ability to use a web-based management interface (SRS Web Interface), which provides functions equivalent to the EPP server functionality.


2.1.1 EPP

The EPP software allows Registrars to communicate with the SRS using a standard protocol. The EPP server software is compliant with all appropriate RFCs and will be updated to comply with any relevant new RFCs or other new standards, as and when they are finalised. All standard EPP operations on SRS objects are supported.

Specifically, the EPP service complies with the following standards:
– RFC 5730 Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP).
– RFC 5731 Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping.
– RFC 5732 Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Host Mapping.
– RFC 5733 Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Contact Mapping.
– RFC 5734 Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Transport over TCP.
– RFC 5910 Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP).
– RFC 3915 Domain Registry Grace Period Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP).
– Extensions to ARI’s EPP service comply with RFC 3735 Guidelines for Extending the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP).


2.1.1.1 SECURITY FOR EPP SERVICE

To avoid abuse and to mitigate potential fraudulent operations, the EPP server software uses a number of security mechanisms that restrict the source of incoming connections and prescribe the authentication and authorisation of the client. Connections are further managed by command rate limiting and are restricted to only a certain number for each Registrar, to help reduce unwanted fraudulent and other activities. Additionally, secure communication to the EPP interface is required, lowering the likelihood of the authentication mechanisms being compromised.

The EPP server has restrictions on the operations it is permitted to make to the data within the registry database. Except as allowed by the EPP protocol, the EPP server cannot update the credentials used by Registrars for access to the SRS. These credentials include those used by Registrars to login to ARI’s SRS Web Interface and the EPP service.

Secure communication to the EPP server is achieved via the encryption of EPP sessions. The registry system and associated toolkits support AES 128 and 256 via TLS.

The Production and Operational Testing and Evaluation (OTE) EPP service is protected behind a secure firewall that only accepts connections from registered IP addresses. Registrars are required to supply host IP addresses that they intend to use to access the EPP service.
Certificates are used for encrypted communications with the registry. Registrars require a valid public⁄private key pair signed by the ARI CA to verify authenticity. These certificates are used to establish a TLS secure session between client and server.

EPP contains credential elements in its specification which are used as an additional layer of authentication. In accordance with the EPP specification, the server does not allow client sessions to carry out any operations until credentials are verified.

The EPP server software combines the authentication and authorisation elements described above to ensure the various credentials supplied are associated with the same identity. This verification requires that:
– The username must match the common name in the digital certificate.
– The certificate must be presented from a source IP listed against the Registrar whose common name appears in the certificate.
– The username and password must match the user name and password listed against the Registrar’s account with that source IP address.

To manage normal operations and prevent an accidental or intentional Denial of Service, the EPP server can be configured to rate limit activities by individual Registrars.


2.1.1.2 STABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

The measures that restrict Registrars to a limit of connections and operations for security purposes also serve to keep the SRS and the EPP server within an acceptable performance and resource utilisation band. Therefore, scaling the service is an almost linear calculation based on well-defined parameters.

The EPP server offers consistent information between Registrars and the SRS Web Interface. The relevant pieces of this information are replicated to the DNS within seconds of alteration, thus ensuring that a strong consistency between the SRS and DNS is maintained at all times.


2.1.2 SRS WEB INTERFACE

The registry SRS Web Interface offers Registrars an alternative SRS interaction mechanism to the EPP server. Available over HTTPS, this interface can be used to carry out all operations which would otherwise occur via EPP, as well as many others. Registrars can use the SRS Web Interface, the EPP server interface or both – with no loss of consistency within the SRS.


2.1.2.1 SECURITY AND CONSISTENCY CONSIDERATIONS FOR SRS WEB INTERFACE

The SRS Web Interface contains measures to prevent abuse and to mitigate fraudulent operations. By restricting access, providing user level authentication and authorisation, and protecting the communications channel, the application limits both the opportunity and scope of security compromise.

Registrars are able to create individual users that are associated with their Registrar account. By allocating the specific operations each user can access, Registrars have full control over how their individual staff members interact with the SRS. Users can be audited to identify which operations were conducted and to which objects those operations were applied.

A secure connection is required before credentials are exchanged and once authenticated. On login, any existing user sessions are invalidated and a new session is generated, thereby mitigating session-fixation attacks and reducing possibilities that sessions could be compromised.


2.1.3 SECURING AND MAINTAINING CONSISTENCY OF REGISTRY-REGISTRAR INTERACTION SYSTEMS

ARI ensures all systems through which Registrars interact with the SRS remain consistent with each other and apply the same security rules. Additionally, ARI also ensures that operations on SRS objects are restricted to the appropriate entity. For example:
– In order to initiate a transfer a Registrar must provide the associated domain password (authinfo) which will only be known by the registrant and the current sponsoring Registrar.
– Only sponsoring Registrars are permitted to update registry objects.
All operations conducted by Registrars on SRS objects are auditable and are identifiable to the specific Registrar’s user account, IP address and the time of the operation.


2.2 DISSEMINATE STATUS INFORMATION OF TLD ZONE SERVERS TO REGISTRARS

The status of TLD zone servers and their ability to reflect changes in the SRS is of great importance to Registrars and Internet users alike. ARI will ensure that any change from normal operations is communicated to the relevant stakeholders as soon as is appropriate. Such communication might be prior to the status change, during the status change and⁄or after the status change (and subsequent reversion to normal) – as appropriate to the party being informed and the circumstance of the status change.

Normal operations are those when:
– DNS servers respond within SLAs for DNS resolution.
– Changes in the SRS are reflected in the zone file according to the DNS update time SLA.

The SLAs are those from Specification 10 of the Registry Agreement.
A deviation from normal operations, whether it is registry wide or restricted to a single DNS node, will result in the appropriate status communication being sent.


2.2.1 COMMUNICATION POLICY

ARI maintains close communication with Registrars regarding the performance and consistency of the TLD zone servers.

A contact database containing relevant contact information for each Registrar is maintained. In many cases, this includes multiple forms of contact, including email, phone and physical mailing address. Additionally, up-to-date status information of the TLD zone servers is provided within the SRS Web Interface.

Communication using the Registrar contact information discussed above will occur prior to any maintenance that has the potential to effect the access to, consistency of, or reliability of the TLD zone servers. If such maintenance is required within a short time frame, immediate communication occurs using the above contact information. In either case, the nature of the maintenance and how it affects the consistency or accessibility of the TLD zone servers, and the estimated time for full restoration, are included within the communication.

That being said, the TLD zone server infrastructure has been designed in such a way that we expect no down time. Only individual sites will potentially require downtime for maintenance; however the DNS service itself will continue to operate with 100% availability.


2.2.2 SECURITY AND STABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

ARI restricts zone server status communication to Registrars, thereby limiting the scope for malicious abuse of any maintenance window. Additionally, ARI ensures Registrars have effective operational procedures to deal with any status change of the TLD nameservers and will seek to align its communication policy to those procedures.


2.3 ZONE FILE ACCESS PROVIDER INTEGRATION

Individuals or organisations that wish to have a copy of the full zone file can do so using the Zone Data Access service. This process is still evolving; however the basic requirements are unlikely to change. All registries will publish the zone file in a common format accessible via secure FTP at an agreed URL.

ARI will fully comply with the processes and procedures dictated by the Centralised Zone Data Access Provider (CZDA Provider or what it evolves into) for adding and removing Zone File access consumers from its authentication systems. This includes:

– Zone file format and location.
– Availability of the zone file access host via FTP.
– Logging of requests to the service (including the IP address, time, user and activity log).
– Access frequency.


2.4 ZONE FILE UPDATE

To ensure changes within the SRS are reflected in the zone file rapidly and securely, ARI updates the zone file on the TLD zone servers using software compliant with RFC 2136 (Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)) and RFC 2845 (Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)).

This updating process follows a staged but rapid propagation of zone update information from the SRS, outwards to the TLD zone servers – which are visible to the Internet. As changes to the SRS data occur, those changes are updated to isolated systems which act as the authoritative primary server for the zone, but remain inaccessible to systems outside ARI’s network. The primary servers notify the designated secondary servers, which service queries for the TLD zone from the public. Upon notification, the secondary servers transfer the incremental changes to the zone and publicly present those changes.

The protocols for dynamic update are robust and mature, as is their implementation in DNS software. The protocols’ mechanisms for ensuring consistency within and between updates are fully implemented in ARI’s TLD zone update procedures. These mechanisms ensure updates are quickly propagated while the data remains consistent within each incremental update, regardless of the speed or order of individual update transactions. ARI has used this method for updating zone files in all its TLDs including the .au ccTLD, pioneering this method during its inception in 2002. Mechanisms separate to RFC 2136-compliant transfer processes exist; to check and ensure domain information is consistent with the SRS on each TLD zone server within 10 minutes of a change.


2.5 OPERATION OF ZONE SERVERS

ARI maintains TLD zone servers which act as the authoritative servers to which the TLD is delegated.


2.5.1 SECURITY AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF ZONE SERVER OPERATIONS

The potential risks associated with operating TLD zone servers are recognised by ARI such that we will perform the steps required to protect the integrity and consistency of the information they provide, as well as to protect the availability and accessibility of those servers to hosts on the Internet. The TLD zone servers comply with all relevant RFCs for DNS and DNSSEC, as well as BCPs for the operation and hosting of DNS servers. The TLD zone servers will be updated to support any relevant new enhancements or improvements adopted by the IETF.

The DNS servers are geographically dispersed across multiple secure data centres in strategic locations around the world. By combining multi-homed servers and geographic diversity, ARI’s zone servers remain impervious to site level, supplier level or geographic level operational disruption.
The TLD zone servers are protected from accessibility loss by malicious intent or misadventure, via the provision of significant over-capacity of resources and access paths. Multiple independent network paths are provided to each TLD zone server and the query servicing capacity of the network exceeds the extremely conservatively anticipated peak load requirements by at least 10 times, to prevent loss of service should query loads significantly increase.

As well as the authentication, authorisation and consistency checks carried out by the Registrar access systems and DNS update mechanisms, ARI reduces the scope for alteration of DNS data by following strict DNS operational practices:
– TLD zone servers are not shared with other services.
– The primary authoritative TLD zone server is inaccessible outside ARI’s network.
– TLD zone servers only serve authoritative information.
– The TLD zone is signed with DNSSEC and a DNSSEC Practice⁄Policy Statement published.


2.6 DISSEMINATION OF CONTACT OR OTHER INFORMATION

Registries are required to provide a mechanism to identify the relevant contact information for a domain. The traditional method of delivering this is via the WhoIs service, a plain text protocol commonly accessible on TCP port 43. ARI also provides the same functionality to users via a web-based WhoIs service. Functionality remains the same with the web-based service, which only requires a user to have an Internet browser.

Using the WhoIs service, in either of its forms, allows a user to query for domain-related information. Users can query for domain details, contact details, nameserver details or Registrar details.

A WhoIs service, which complies with RFC 3912, is provided to disseminate contact and other information related to a domain within the TLD zone.


2.6.1 SECURITY AND STABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

ARI ensures the service is available and accurate for Internet users, while limiting the opportunity for its malicious use. Many reputation and anti-abuse services rely on the availability and accuracy of the WhoIs service, however the potential for abuse of the WhoIs service exists.

Therefore, certain restrictions are made to the access of WhoIs services, the nature of which depend on the delivery method – either web-based or the traditional text-based port 43 service. In all cases, there has been careful consideration given to the benefits of WhoIs to the Internet community, as well as the potential harm to registrants – as individuals and a group – with regard to WhoIs access restrictions.

The WhoIs service presents data from the registry database in real time. However this access is restricted to reading the appropriate data only. The WhoIs service does not have the ability to alter data or to access data not related to the WhoIs service. The access limitations placed on the WhoIs services prevent any deliberate or incidental denial of service that might impact other registry services.

Restrictions placed on accessing WhoIs services do not affect legitimate use. All restrictions are designed to target abusive volume users and to provide legitimate users with a fast and available service. ARI has the ability to ‘whitelist’ legitimate bulk users of WhoIs, to ensure they are not impacted by standard volume restrictions.

The data presentation format is consistent with the canonical representation of equivalent fields, as defined in the EPP specifications and ICANN agreement.


2.6.1.1 PORT 43 WHOIS

A port 43-based WhoIs service complying with RFC 3912 is provided and will be updated to meet any other relevant standards or best practice guidelines related to the operation of a WhoIs service.
While the text-based service can support thousands of simultaneous queries, it has dynamic limits on queries per IP address to restrict data mining efforts. In the event of identified malicious use of the service, access from a single IP address or address ranges can be limited or blocked.


2.6.1.2 WEB-BASED WHOIS

ARI’s web-based WhoIs service provides information consistent with that contained within the SRS.
The web-based WhoIs service contains an Image Verification Check (IVC) and query limits per IP address. These restrictions strike a balance between acceptable public usage and abusive use or data mining. The web-based WhoIs service can blacklist IP addresses or ranges to prevent abusive use of the service.


2.7 IDNs – INTERNATIONALISED DOMAIN NAMES

An Internationalised Domain Name (IDN) allows registrants to register domains in their native language and have it display correctly in IDN aware software. This includes allowing a language to be read in the manner that would be common for its readers. For example, an Arabic domain would be presented right to left for an Arabic IDN aware browser.

The inclusion of IDNs into the TLD zones is supported by ARI. All the registry services, such as the EPP service, SRS Web Interface and RDPS (web and port 43), support IDNs. However there are some stability and security considerations related to IDNs which fall outside the general considerations applicable individually to those services.


2.7.1 STABILITY CONSIDERATIONS SPECIFIC TO IDN

To avoid the intentional or accidental registration of visually similar chars, and to avoid identity confusion between domains, there are several restrictions on the registration of IDNs.


2.7.1.1 PREVENT CROSS LANGUAGE REGISTRATIONS

Domains registered within a particular language are restricted to only the chars of that language. This avoids the use of visually similar chars within one language which mimic the appearance of a label within another language, regardless of whether that label is already within the DNS or not.


2.7.1.2 INTER-LANGUAGE AND INTRA-LANGUAGE VARIANTS TO PREVENT SIMILAR REGISTRATIONS

ARI restricts child domains to a specific language and prevents registrations in one language being confused with a registration in another language, for example Cyrillic ? (U+0430) and Latin a (U+0061).


2.8 DNSSEC

DNSSEC provides a set of extensions to the DNS that allow an Internet user (normally the resolver acting on a user’s behalf) to validate that the DNS responses they receive were not manipulated en-route.

This type of fraud, commonly called ‘man in the middle’, allows a malicious party to misdirect Internet users. DNSSEC allows a domain owner to sign their domain and to publish the signature, so that all DNS consumers who visit that domain can validate that the responses they receive are as the domain owner intended.

Registries, as the operators of the parent domain for registrants, must publish the DNSSEC material received from registrants, so that Internet users can trust the material they receive from the domain owner. This is commonly referred to as a ‘chain of trust’. Internet users trust the root (operated by IANA), which publishes the registries’ DNSSEC material, therefore registries inherit this trust. Domain owners within the TLD subsequently inherit trust from the parent domain when the registry publishes their DNSSEC material.

In accordance with new gTLD requirements, the TLD zone will be DNSSEC signed and the receipt of DNSSEC material from Registrars for child domains is supported in all provisioning systems.


2.8.1 STABILITY AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DNSSEC

2.8.1.1 DNSSEC PRACTICE STATEMENT

ARI’s DNSSEC Practice Statement is included in our response to Question 43. The DPS following the guidelines set out in the draft IETF DNSOP DNSSEC DPS Framework document.


2.8.1.2 RECEIPT OF PUBLIC KEYS FROM REGISTRARS

The public key for a child domain is received by ARI from the Registrar via either the EPP or SRS Web Interface. ARI uses an SHA-256 digest to generate the DS Resource Record (RR) for inclusion into the zone file.


2.8.1.3 RESOLUTION STABILITY

DNSSEC is considered to have made the DNS more trustworthy; however some transitional considerations need to be taken into account. DNSSEC increases the size and complexity of DNS responses. ARI ensures the TLD zone servers are accessible and offer consistent responses over UDP and TCP.

The increased UDP and TCP traffic which results from DNSSEC is accounted for in both network path access and TLD zone server capacity. ARI will ensure that capacity planning appropriately accommodates the expected increase in traffic over time.

ARI complies with all relevant RFCs and best practice guides in operating a DNSSEC-signed TLD. This includes conforming to algorithm updates as appropriate. To ensure Key Signing Key Rollover procedures for child domains are predictable, DS records will be published as soon as they are received via either the EPP server or SRS Web Interface. This allows child domain operators to rollover their keys with the assurance that their timeframes for both old and new keys are reliable.



3 APPROACH TO SECURITY AND STABILITY

Stability and security of the Internet is an important consideration for the registry system. To ensure that the registry services are reliably secured and remain stable under all conditions, ARI takes a conservative approach with the operation and architecture of the registry system.

By architecting all registry services to use the least privileged access to systems and data, risk is significantly reduced for other systems and the registry services as a whole should any one service become compromised. By continuing that principal through to our procedures and processes, we ensure that only access that is necessary to perform tasks is given. ARI has a comprehensive approach to security modelled of the ISO27001 series of standards and explored further in the relevant questions of this response.

By ensuring all our services adhering to all relevant standards, ARI ensures that entities which interact with the registry services do so in a predictable and consistent manner. When variations or enhancements to services are made, they are also aligned with the appropriate interoperability standards.

Demonstration of Technical & Operational Capability


24. Shared Registration System (SRS) Performance

We have engaged ARI Registry Services (ARI) to deliver services for this TLD. ARI provide registry services for a number of TLDs including the .au ccTLD. For more background information on ARI please see the attachment ‘Q24 – ARI Background & Roles.pdf’. This response describes the SRS as implemented by ARI.


1 INTRODUCTION

ARI has demonstrated delivery of an SRS with exceptional availability, performance and reliability. ARI are experienced running mission critical SRSs and have significant knowledge of the industry and building and supporting SRSs.

ARI’s SRS has successfully supported a large group of Registrars for ASCII and IDN based TLDs. The system is proven to sustain high levels of concurrency, transaction load, and system uptime. ARI’s SRS meets the following requirements:
– Resilient to wide range of security & availability threats
– Consistently exceeds performance & availability SLAs
– Allows capacity increase with minimal impact to service
– Provides fair & equitable provisioning for all Registrars



2 CAPACITY

ARI’s SRS was built to sustain 20M domain names. Based on ARI’s experience running a ccTLD registries and industry analysis, ARI were able to calculate the conservative characteristics of a registry this size.

Through conservative statistical analysis of the .au registry and data presented in the May 2011 ICANN reports for the .com .net, .org, .mobi, .info, .biz and .asia [http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄resources⁄registries⁄reports] we know there is:
– An average of 70 SRS TPS per domain, per month
– A ratio of 3 query to 2 transform txs
This indicates an expected monthly transaction volume of 1,400M txs (840M query and 560M transforms).

Through statistical analysis of the .au registry and backed up by the data published in the .net RFP responses [http:⁄⁄archive.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄net-rfp⁄net-rfp-public-comments.htm] we also know:
– The peak daily TPS is 6% of monthly total
– The peak 5 min is 5% of the peak day
Thus we expect a peak EPP tx rate of 14,000 TPS (5,600 transform TPS and 8,400 query TPS)
Through conservative statistical analysis of the .au registry we know:
– The avg no. contacts⁄domain is 3.76
– The avg no. hosts⁄domain is 2.28
This translates into a requirement to store 75.2M contacts and 45.6M hosts.
Finally through real world observations of the .au registry, which has a comprehensive web interface when compared to those offered by current gTLD registries, we know there is an avg of 0.5 HTTP requests⁄sec to the SRS web interface per Registrar. We also know that this behaviour is reasonably flat. To support an estimated 1000 Registrars, would require 500 requests⁄second.
For perspective on the conservativeness of this, the following was taken from data in the May 2011 ICANN reports referenced above:
– .info: ~7.8M names peaks at ~1,400 TPS (projected peak TPS of ~3,600 with 20M)
– .com: ~98M names peaks at ~41,000 TPS (projected peak TPS of ~8,300 TPS with 20M)
– .org: ~9.3M names, peaks at ~1,400 TPS (projected peak TPS of ~3,100 with 20M)

After performing this analysis the projected TPS for .com was still the largest value.
ARI understand the limitations of this method but it serves as a best estimate of probable tx load. ARI has built overcapacity of resources to account for limitations of this method, however as numbers are more conservative than real world observations, we are confident this capacity is sufficient.

This TLD is projected to reach 1 domains at its peak volume and will generate 0.0007 EPP TPS. This will consume 0.00001% of the resources of the SRS infrastructure. As is evident ARI’s SRS can easily accommodate this TLD’s growth plans. See attachment ‘Q24 – Registry Scale Estimates & Resource Allocation.xlsx’ for more information.

ARI expects to provide Registry services to 100 TLDs and a total of 12M domains by end of 2014. With all the TLDs and domains combined, ARI’s SRS infrastructure will be 60% utilized. The SRS infrastructure capacity can be easily scaled as described in Q32.

ARI benchmarked their SRS infrastructure and used the results to calculate the required computing resources for each of the tiers within the architecture; allowing ARI to accurately estimate the required CPU, IOPS, storage and memory requirements for each server, and the network bandwidth & packet throughput requirements for the anticipated traffic. These capacity numbers were then doubled to account for unanticipated traffic spikes, errors in predictions, and headroom for growth. Despite doubling numbers, effective estimated capacity is still reported as 20M. The technical resource allocations are explored in Q32.



3 SRS ARCHITECTURE

ARI’s SRS has the following major components:
– Network Infrastructure
– EPP Application Servers
– SRS Web Interface Application Servers
– SRS Database

Attachment ‘Q24 – SRS.pdf’ shows the SRS systems architecture and data flows. Detail on this architecture is in our response to Q32. ARI provides two distinct interfaces to the SRS: EPP and SRS Web. Registrar SRS traffic enters the ARI network via the redundant Internet link and passes (via the firewall) to the relevant application server for the requested service (EPP or SRS Web). ARI’s EPP interface sustains high volume and throughput domain provisioning transactions for a large number of concurrent Registrar connections. ARI’s SRS Web interface provides an alternative to EPP with a presentation centric interface and provides reporting and verification features additional to those provided by the EPP interface.


3.1 EPP

ARI’s EPP application server is based on EPP as defined in RFCs 5730 – 5734. Registrars send XML based transactions to a load balanced EPP interface which forwards to one of the EPP application servers. The EPP application server then processes the XML and converts the request into database calls that retrieve or modify registry objects in the SRS database. The EPP application server tier comprises of three independent servers with dedicated connections to the registry database. Failure of any one of these servers will cause Registrar connections to automatically re-establish with one of the remaining servers. Additional EPP application servers can be added easily without any downtime. All EPP servers accept EPP both IPv4 & IPv6.


3.2 SRS WEB

The SRS Web application server is a Java web application. Registrars connect via the load balancer to a secure HTTP listener running on the web servers. The SRS web application converts HTTPs requests into database calls which query or update objects in the SRS database. The SRS Web application server tier consists of two independent servers that connect to the database via JDBC. If one of these servers is unavailable the load balancer re-routes requests to the surviving server. Additional servers can be added easily without any downtime. These servers accept both IPv4 & IPv6.


3.3 SRS DATABASE

The SRS database provides persistent storage for domains and supporting objects. It offers a secure way of storing and retrieving objects provisioned within the SRS and is built on the Oracle 11g Enterprise Edition RDBMS. The SRS Database tier consists of four servers clustered using Oracle Real Application Clusters (RAC). In the event of failure of a database server, RAC will transparently transition its client connections to a surviving database host. Additional servers can be added easily without any downtime.


3.4 NUMBER OF SERVERS

EPP Servers – The EPP cluster consists of 3 servers that can more than handle the anticipated 20M domains. This TLD will utilize 0.00001% of this capacity at its peak volume. As the utilisation increases ARI will add additional servers ensuring the utilisation doesn’t exceed 50% of total capacity. Adding a new server to the cluster can be done live without downtime.
SRS Web Servers – The SRS Web cluster consists of 2 servers that can more than handle the anticipated 20M domains. This TLD will utilize 0.00001% of this capacity at its peak volume. As the utilisation increases ARI will add additional servers ensuring the utilisation doesn’t exceed 50% of total capacity. Adding a new server to the cluster can be done live without downtime.
SRS DB Servers – The SRS DB cluster consists of 4 servers that can more than handle the anticipated 20M domains. This TLD will utilize 0.00001% of this capacity at its peak volume. As the utilisation increases ARI will add additional servers ensuring the total utilisation doesn’t exceed 50% of total capacity. Adding a new server to the cluster can be done live without downtime.


3.5 SRS SECURITY

ARI adopts a multi-layered security solution to protect the SRS. An industry leading firewall is deployed behind the edge router and is configured to only allow traffic on the minimum required ports and protocols. Access to the ARI EPP service is restricted to a list of known Registrar IPs.
An Intrusion Detection device is in-line with the firewall to monitor and detect suspicious activity.
All servers are configured with restrictive host based firewalls, intrusion detection, and SELinux. Direct root access to these servers is disabled and all access is audited and logged centrally.
The SRS database is secured by removal of non-essential features and accounts, and ensuring all remaining accounts have strong passwords. All database accounts are assigned the minimum privileges required to execute their business function.
All operating system, database, and network device accounts are subject to strict password management controls such as validity & complexity requirements.
Registrar access to the SRS via EPP or the Web interface is authenticated and secured with multi-factor authentication (NIST Level 3) and digital assertion as follows:
– Registrar’s source IP must be allowed by the front-end firewalls. This source IP is received from the Registrar via a secure communication channel from within the SRS Web interface
– Registrar must use a digital certificate provided by ARI
– Registrar must use authentication credentials that are provided by encrypted email
All communication between the Registrar and the SRS is encrypted using at least 128 bit encryption which been designated as ‘Acceptable’ till ‘2031 and beyond’ by NIST Special Publication 800-57.


3.6 SRS HIGH AVAILABILITY

SRS availability is of paramount. Downtime is eliminated or minimised where possible. The infrastructure contains no single points of failure. N+1 redundancy is used as a minimum, which not only protects against unplanned downtime but also allows ARI to execute maintenance without impacting service.
Redundancy is provided in the network with hot standby devices & multiple links between devices. Failure of any networking component is transparent to Registrar connections.
N+N redundancy is provided in the EPP and SRS Web application server tiers by the deployment of multiple independent servers grouped together as part of a load-balancing scheme. If a server fails the load balancer routes requests to the remaining servers.
N+N redundancy is provided in the database tier by the use of Oracle Real Application Cluster technology. This delivers active⁄active clustering via shared storage. This insulates Registrars from database server failure.
Complete SRS site failure is mitigated by the maintenance of a remote standby site – a duplicate of the primary site ready to be the primary if required.
The standby site database is replicated using real time transaction replication from the main database using Oracle Data Guard physical standby. If required the Data Guard database can be activated quickly and service resumes at the standby site.


3.7 SRS SCALABILITY

ARI’s SRS scales efficiently. At the application server level, additional computing resource can be brought on-line rapidly by deploying a new server online. During benchmarking this has shown near linear.
The database can be scaled horizontally by adding a new cluster node into the RAC cluster online. This can be achieved without disruption to connections. The SRS has demonstrated over 80% scaling at the database level, but due to the distributed locking nature of Oracle RAC, returns are expected to diminish as the number of servers approaches double digits. To combat this ARI ensures that when the cluster is ‘scaled’ more powerful server equipment is added rather than that equal to the current members. Capacity can be added to the SAN at any time without downtime increasing storage and IOPs.


3.8 SRS INTER-OPERABILITY AND DATA SYNCHRONISATION

The SRS interfaces with a number of related registry systems as part of normal operations.

3.8.1 DNS UPDATE
Changes made in the SRS are propagated to the DNS via an ARI proprietary DNS Update process. This process runs on the ‘hidden’ primary master nameserver and waits on a queue. It is notified when the business logic inserts changes into the queue for processing. The DNS Update process reads these queue entries and converts them into DNS update (RFC2136) commands that are sent to the nameserver. The process of synchronising changes to SRS data to the DNS occurs in real-time.

3.8.2 WHOIS
The provisioned data supporting the SRS satisfies WhoIs queries. Thus the WhoIs and SRS share data sets and the WhoIs is instantaneously updated. Under normal operating conditions the WhoIs service is provided by the infrastructure at the secondary site in order to segregate the load and protect SRS from WhoIs demand (and vice versa). WhoIs queries that hit the standby site will query data stored in the standby database – maintained in near real-time using Oracle Active Data Guard. If complete site failure occurs WhoIs and SRS can temporarily share the same operations centre at the same site (capacity numbers are calculated for this).

3.8.3 ESCROW
A daily Escrow extract process executes on the database server via a dedicated database account with restricted read-only access. The results are then transferred to the local Escrow Communications server by SSH.



4 OPERATIONAL PLAN

ARI follow defined policies⁄procedures that have developed over time by running critical registry systems. Some principals captured by these are:
– Conduct all changes & upgrades under strict and well-practised change control procedures
– test, test and test again
– Maintain Staging environments as close as possible to production infrastructure⁄configuration
– Eliminate all single points of failure
– Conduct regular security reviews & audits
– Maintain team knowledge & experience via skills transfer⁄training
– Replace hardware when no longer supported by vendor
– Maintain spare hardware for all critical components
– Execute regular restore tests of all backups
– Conduct regular capacity planning exercises
– Monitor everything from multiple places but ensure monitoring is not ‘chatty’
– Employ best of breed hardware & software products & frameworks (such as ITIL, ISO27001 and Prince2)
– Maintain two distinct OT&E environments to support pre-production testing for Registrars



5 SLA, RELIABILITY & COMPLIANCE

ARI’s SRS adheres to and goes beyond the scope of Specification 6 and Specification 10 of the Registry Agreement. ARI’s EPP service is XML compliant and XML Namespace aware. It complies with the EPP protocol defined in RFC5730, and the object mappings for domain, hosts & contacts are compliant with RFC 5731, 5732 & 5733 respectively. The transport over TCP is compliant with RFC5734. The service also complies with official extensions to support DNSSEC, RFC5910, & Redemption Grace Period, RFC 3915.

ARI’s SRS is sized to sustain a peak transaction rate of 14,000 TPS while meeting strict internal Operational Level Agreements (OLAs). The monthly-based OLAs below are more stringent than those in Specification 10 (Section 2).
EPP Service Availability: 100%
EPP Session Command Round Trip Time (RTT): 〈=1000ms for 95% of commands
EPP Query Command Round Trip Time (RTT): 〈=500ms for 95% of commands
EPP Transform Command Round Trip Time (RTT): 〈=1000ms for 95% of commands
SRS Web Interface Service Availability: 99.9%

ARI measure the elapsed time of every query, transform and session EPP transaction, and calculate the percentage of commands that fall within OLA on a periodic basis. If percentage value falls below configured thresholds on-call personnel are alerted.

SRS availability is measured by ARI’s monitoring system which polls both the EPP and SRS Web services status. These checks are implemented as full end to end monitoring scripts that mimic user interaction, providing a true representation of availability. These ‘scripts’ are executed from external locations on the Internet.



6 RESOURCES

This function will be performed by ARI. ARI staff are industry leading experts in domain name registries with the experience and knowledge to deliver outstanding SRS performance.

The SRS is designed, built, operated and supported by the following ARI departments:
– Products and Consulting Team (7 staff)
– Production Support Group (27 staff)
– Development Team (11 staff)

A detailed list of the departments, roles and responsibilities in ARI is provided in attachment ‘Q24 – ARI Background & Roles.pdf’. This attachment describes the functions of the teams and the number and nature of staff within.

The number of resources required to design, build, operate and support the SRS does not vary significantly with, and is not linearly proportional to, the number or size of TLDs that ARI provides registry services to.

ARI provides registry backend services to 5 TLDs and has a vast experience in estimating the number of resources required to support a SRS.

Based on past experience ARI estimates that the existing staff is adequate to support an SRS that supporting at least 50M domains. Since this TLD projects 1 domains, 0.000002% of these resources are allocated to this TLD. See attachment ‘Q24 – Registry Scale Estimates & Resource Allocation.xlsx’ for more information.

ARI protects against loss of critical staff by employing multiple people in each role. Staff members have a primary role plus a secondary role for protection against personnel absence. Additionally ARI can scale resources as required, trained resources can be added to any of the teams with a 2 month lead time.

The Products and Consulting team is responsible for product management of the SRS solution including working with clients and the industry to identify new features or changes required. The team consists of:
– 1 Products and Consulting Manager
– 1 Product Manager
– 1 Technical Product Manager
– 4 Domain Name Industry Consultants

The Production Support Group (PSG) is responsible for the design, deployment and maintenance of the SRS infrastructure including capacity planning and monitoring as well as security aspects – ensuring the SRS services are available and performing at the appropriate level and operating correctly. The team consists of:
– Production Support Manager
– Service Desk:
– 1 Level 1 Support Team Lead
– 8 Customer Support Representatives (Level 1 support)
– 1 Level 2 Support Team Lead
– 4 Registry Specialists (Level 2 support)
– Operations (Level 3 support):
– 1 Operations Team Lead
– 2 Systems Administrators
– 2 Database Administrators
– 2 Network Engineers
– Implementation:
– 1 Project Manager
– 2 Systems Administrators
– 1 Database Administrator
– 1 Network Engineer

The development team is responsible for implementing changes and new features into the SRS as well as bug fixing and complex issue diagnosis. The team consists of:
– 1 Development Manager
– 2 Business Analysts
– 6 Developers
– 2 Quality Analysts
These resources sufficiently accommodate the needs of this TLD, and are included in ARI’s fees as described in our Financial responses.

25. Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)

We have engaged ARI Registry Services (ARI) to deliver services for this TLD. ARI provide registry services for a number of TLDs including the .au ccTLD. For more background information on ARI please see the attachment ‘Q25 – ARI Background & Roles.pdf’. This response describes the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) interface as implemented by ARI.



1 INTRODUCTION

ARI’s EPP service is XML compliant and XML Namespace aware. The service complies with the EPP protocol defined in RFC5730, and the object mappings for domain, hosts and contacts are compliant with RFC5731-3 respectively. The transport over TCP is implemented in compliance with RFC5734. The service also complies with the official extensions to support DNSSEC, RFC5910 and Redemption Grace Period, RFC3915. ARI implemented EPP draft version 0.6 in 2002, then migrated to EPP RFC 1.0 on its publishing in 2004. The system has operated live since 2002 in the .au ccTLD.

Descriptions in this response follow the terminology used in the EPP RFCs. When referring to the software involved in the process, ARI’s EPP interface is called the server, and the software used by Registrars is called the client.



2 TRANSPORT LAYER

The ARI EPP service implements the RFC5734 – EPP Transport over TCP. Connections are allowed using TLSv1 encryption, optionally supporting SSLv2 Hello for compatibility with legacy clients. AES cipher suites for TLS as described in RFC3268 are the only ones allowed.


2.1 AUTHENTICATION

Registrar access to the EPP interface is authenticated and secured with multi-factor authentication (NIST Level 3) and digital assertion as follows. Registrars must:
– present a certificate, during TLS negotiation, signed by the ARI Certificate Authority (CA). The server returns a certificate also signed by the ARI CA. Not presenting a valid certificate results in session termination. ARI requires that the Common Name in the subject field of the certificate identifies the Registrar.
– originate connections from an IP address that is known to be assigned to the Registrar with that Common Name.
– Registrar must use authentication credentials provided to the Registrar via encrypted email
– Registrars aren’t able to exceed a fixed number of concurrent connections. The connection limit is prearranged and designed to prevent abuse of Registrars’ systems from affecting the Registry. The limit is set to reasonable levels for each Registrar, but can be increased to ensure legitimate traffic is unaffected. If any of the above conditions aren’t met the connection is terminated.
All communication between the Registrars and the EPP service is encrypted using at least 128 bit encryption which been designated as ‘Acceptable’ till ‘2031 and beyond’ by NIST Special Publication 800-57.


2.2 CONNECTION CLOSE

The server may close the connection as a result of a logout, an error where the state of the connection is indeterminate, or after a timeout. Timeout occurs where no complete EPP message is received on the connection for 10 minutes.



3 EPP PROTOCOL

This section describes the interface relating to the EPP protocol described in RFC5730. This includes session management, poll message functionality and object mappings for domains, hosts and contacts.


3.1 SESSION MANAGEMENT

Session management refers to login and logout commands, used to authenticate and end a session with the SRS. The Login command is used to establish a session between the client and the server. This command succeeds when:
– The username supplied matches the Common Name in the digital certificate used in establishing the TLS session.
– The provided password is valid for the user.
– The user’s access to the system isn’t suspended.
The Logout command is used to end an active session. On processing a logout the server closes the underlying connection. The Hello command can be used as a session keep-alive mechanism.


3.2 SERVICE MESSAGES

Offline notifications pertaining to certain events are stored in a queue. The client is responsible for polling this queue for new messages and to acknowledge read messages. Messages include notification about server modification of sponsored objects, transfer operations, and balance thresholds.



4 EPP OBJECT MAPPINGS

This section covers the interface for the 3 core EPP objects; domain, host and contact objects, as per RFC5731, 5732, & 5733 respectively.

The EPP domain, contact and host object mapping describes an interface for the check, info, create, delete, renew (domain only), transfer (domain & contact only) and update commands. For domain objects the server doesn’t support the use of host attributes as described by RFC5731, but rather uses host objects as described by RFC5731 and RFC5732. Details of each command are:
– check command: checks availability of 1 or more domain, contact or host objects in the SRS. Domain names will be shown as unavailable if in use, invalid or reserved, other objects will be unavailable if in use or invalid.
– info command: retrieves the information of an object provisioned in the SRS. Full information is returned to the sponsoring client or any client that provides authorisation information for the object. Non-sponsoring clients are returned partial information (no more than is available in the WhoIs).
– create command: provisions objects in the SRS. To ascertain whether an object is available for provisioning, the same rules for the check command apply.
– delete command: begins the process of removing an object from the SRS. Domain names transition into the redemption period and any applicable grace periods are applied. Domain names within the Add Grace Period are purged immediately. All other objects are purged immediately if they are not linked.
– renew command (domain only): extends the registration period of a domain name. The renewal period must be between 1 to 10 years inclusive and the current remaining registration period, plus the amount requested in the renewal mustn’t exceed 10 years.
– transfer command (domain and contact only): provides several operations for the management of the transfer of object sponsorship between clients. Clients that provide correct authorisation information for the object can request transfers. Domain names may be rejected from transfer within 60 days of creation or last transfer. The requesting client may cancel the transfer, or the sponsoring client may reject or approve the transfer. Both the gaining and losing clients may query the status of the current pending or last completed transfer.
– update command: updates authorisation information, delegation information (domains), and registration data pertaining to an object.



5 NON-PROPRIETARY EPP MAPPINGS

ARI’s EPP service implements 2 non-proprietary EPP mappings, to support the required domain name lifecycle and to provide & manage DNSSEC information. The relevant schema documents aren’t provided as they are published as RFCs in the RFC repository.


5.1 GRACE PERIOD MAPPING

The Domain Registry Grace Period Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (as per RFC 3915) is used to support the domain name lifecycle as per existing TLDs. The update command is extended by the restore command to facilitate the restoration of previously deleted domains in the redemption period. This command defines 2 operations, request & report, described here:
– Request operation: requests the restoration of a domain.
– Report operation: completes the restoration by specifying the information supporting the restoration of the domain. The restore report must include a copy of the WhoIs information at both the time the domain was deleted & restored, including the restore reason.


5.2 DNSSEC MAPPING

The Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping for EPP, as per RFC5910, is used to support the provisioning of DNS Security Extensions. ARI requires clients use the Key Data interface. Clients may associate a maximum of 4 keys per domain. The registry system generates the corresponding DS data using the SHA-256 digest algorithm for the domain and any active variant domains.

ARI is aware of issues DNSSEC causes when transferring DNS providers – a transfer of Registrar usually means a change in DNS provider. DNSSEC key data won’t be removed from the SRS or the DNS if a transfer occurs. It is the responsibility of and requires the cooperation of the registrant, Registrars, and DNS providers, to provide a seamless transition. ARI observes progress with this issue and implements industry agreed solutions as available. DNSSEC information is included in info responses when the secDNS namespace in login.



6 PROPRIETARY MAPPING

The registry system supports 3 additional EPP extensions where no published standard for the required functionality exists. Developed to conform to the requirements specified in RFC3735, these extensions include the provisioning of Internationalised Domain Names and domain name variants, and the association of arbitrary data with a domain name. These 3 extensions are introduced below, and further described in the attached schema documentation.


6.1 INTERNATIONALISED DOMAIN NAMES

ARI has developed an extension to facilitate the registration and management of Internationalised Domain Names as per RFCs 5890-5893 (collectively known as the IDNA 2008 protocol). This extension extends the domain create command and the info response.

The create command is extended to capture the language table identifier that identifies the corresponding IDN language table for the domain name. Additionally the extension requires the Unicode form to avoid an inconsistency with DNS-form, as per RFC 5891.

The domain info command is extended to identify the language tag and Unicode form provided in the initial create command. This information is disclosed to all querying clients that provided the extension namespace at login. This extension is documented in the attachment ‘Q25 – idnadomain-1.0.pdf’.


6.2 VARIANT

ARI has developed an extension to facilitate the management of Domain Name variants. This extension extends the domain update command and the domain create and info responses. The domain update command is extended to allow the addition (activation) and removal (de-activation) of domain name variants subject to registry operator policy.

The domain create and info responses are extended to return the list of activated domain name variants. This information is disclosed to all querying clients that provided the extension namespace at login. The extension is documented in the attachment ‘Q25 – variant-1.1.pdf’.


6.3 KEY-VALUE

ARI has developed an extension to facilitate the transport of arbitrary data between clients and the SRS without the need for developing EPP Extensions for each specific use-case. This extension extends the domain create and domain update transform commands and the domain info query command. This extension is documented in the attachment ‘Q25 – kv-1.0.pdf’.



7 ADDITIONAL SECURITY

The registry system provides additional mechanisms to support a robust interface. The use of command rate limiting enables the registry to respond to and withstand erroneous volumes of commands, while a user permission model provides fine-grained access to the EPP interface. These 2 mechanisms are described below.


7.1 RATE LIMITING

The registry system supports command and global rate limits using a token-bucket algorithm. Limits apply to each connection to ensure fair and equitable use by all. Clients that exceed limits receive a command failed response message indicating breach of the limit.


7.2 USER PERMISSION MODEL

The registry system supports a fine-grained permission model controlling access to each specific command. By default, clients receive access to all functionality; however it is possible to remove access to a specific command in response to abuse or threat to stability of the system. Clients that attempt a command they have lost permission to execute, receive an EPP command failed response indicating loss of authorisation.



8 COMPLIANCE

Compliance with EPP RFCs is achieved through design and quality assurance (QA). The EPP interface was designed to validate all incoming messages against the respective XML Schema syntax. The XML Schema is copied directly from the relevant RFCs to avoid any ambiguity on version used. Inbound messages that are either malformed XML or invalid are rejected with a 2400 response. Outbound messages are validated against the XML Schema, and if an invalid response is generated, it is replaced with a known valid pre-composed 2400 response, and logged for later debugging.

A QA process provides confidence that changes don’t result in regressions in the interface. Automated build processes execute test suites that ensure every facet of the EPP service (including malformed input, commands sequencing and synchronisation, and boundary values) is covered and compliant with RFCs and the EPP service specification. These tests are executed prior to committing code and automatically nightly. The final deliverable is packaged and tested again to ensure no defects were introduced in the packaging process.

New versions of the EPP Service follow a deployment schedule. The new version is deployed into an OT&E environment for Registrar integration testing. Registrars are encouraged during this stage to test their systems operate correctly. After a fixed time in OT&E without issue, new versions are scheduled for production deployment. This ensures incompatibilities with RFCs that made it through QA processes are detected in test environments prior reaching production.

ARI surveys Registrars for information about the EPP client toolkit. These surveys indicated that while many Registrars use ARI toolkits, several Registrars use either their own or that from another registry. The ability for Registrars to integrate with the ARI EPP service without using the supplied toolkit indicates the service is compliant with RFCs.

ARI is committed to providing an EPP service that integrates with third party toolkits and as such tests are conducted using said toolkits. Any issues identified during testing fall into the following categories:
– Third-party toolkit not compliant with EPP
– EPP service not compliant with EPP
– Both third-party toolkit and EPP service are compliant, however another operational issue causes an issue.

Defects are raised and change management processes are followed. Change requests may also be raised to promote integration of third-party toolkits and to meet common practice.



9 CAPACITY

This TLD is projected to reach 1 domains at its peak volume and will generate 0.0007 EPP TPS. This will consume 0.00001% of the EPP resources. ARI’s SRS can easily accommodate this TLD. This was described in considerable detail in the capacity section of question 24.



10 RESOURCES

This function will be performed by ARI. ARI provides a technical support team to support Registrars and also provides Registrars with a tool kit (in Java and C++) implementing the EPP protocol. Normal operations for all registry services are managed by ARI’s Production Support Group (PSG), who ensure the EPP server is available and performing appropriately.

Faults relating to connections with or functionality of the EPP server are managed by PSG. ARI monitors EPP availability and functionality as part of its monitoring practices, and ensures PSG staff are available to receive fault reports from Registrars any time. PSG has the appropriate network, Unix and application (EPP and load balancing) knowledge to ensure the EPP service remains accessible and performs as required. These ARI departments support EPP:
– Products and Consulting Team (7 staff)
– Production Support Group (27 staff)
– Development Team (11 staff)

A detailed list of the departments roles and responsibilities in ARI is provided as attachment ‘Q25 – ARI Background & Roles.pdf’. This attachment describes the functions of the above teams and the exact number and nature of staff within.

The number of resources required to design, build, operate and support the SRS does not vary significantly with, and is not linearly proportional to, the number or size of TLDs that ARI provides registry services to.

ARI provides registry backend services to 5 TLDs and has a wealth of experience in estimating the number of resources required to support a registry system.

Based on past experience ARI estimates that existing staff are adequate to support a registry system that supports in excess of 50M domains. Since this TLD projects 1 domains, 0.000002% of these resources are allocated to this TLD. See attachment ‘Q25 – Registry Scale Estimates & Resource Allocation.xlsx’ for more information.

ARI protects against loss of critical staff by employing multiple people in each role. Staff members have a primary role plus a secondary role for protection against personnel absence. Additionally ARI can scale resources as required, trained resources can be added to any of the above teams with a 2-month lead time.


10.1 TEAM DETAILS

The products and consulting team is responsible for product management of the EPP solution, and works with clients and industry to identify required system features or changes. The team consists of:
– 1 Products and Consulting Manager
– 1 Product Manager
– 1 Technical Product Manager
– 4 Domain Name Industry Consultants

The Production Support Group (PSG) is responsible for the design, deployment and maintenance of the EPP infrastructure including capacity planning, monitoring, and security. This team ensures the EPP services are available and performing appropriately. The team consists of:
– Production Support Manager
– Service Desk:
– 1 Level 1 Support Team Lead
– 8 Customer Support Representatives (Level 1 support)
– 1 Level 2 Support Team Lead
– 4 Registry Specialists (Level 2 support)
– Operations (Level 3 support):
– 1 Operations Team Lead
– 2 Systems Administrators
– 2 Database Administrators
– 2 Network Engineers
– Implementation:
– 1 Project Manager
– 2 Systems Administrators
– 1 Database Administrator
– 1 Network Engineer

The development team is responsible for EPP changes and features, bug fixes and issue diagnosis. The team consists of:
– 1 Development Manager
– 2 Business Analysts
– 6 Developers
– 2 Quality Analysts

These resources sufficiently accommodate the needs of this TLD, and are included in ARI’s fees as described in our financial responses.

26. Whois

We have engaged ARI Registry Services (ARI) to deliver services for this TLD. ARI provide registry services for a number of TLDs including the .au ccTLD. For more background information on ARI please see the attachment ‘Q26 – ARI Background & Roles.pdf’. This response describes the WhoIs interface as implemented by ARI.


1 INTRODUCTION

ARI’s WhoIs service is for all domain names, contacts, nameservers and Registrars provisioned in the registry database. This response describes the port 43 and web interfaces of WhoIs, security controls to mitigate abuse, compliance with bulk access requirements for registration data, and the architecture delivering the service.


2 PORT 43 WHOIS SERVICE

WhoIs is on TCP port 43 in accordance with RFC3912. Requests are made in semi-free text format and ended by CR & LF. The server responds with a semi-free text format, terminating the response by connection close.

To support IDNs and Localised data we assume the query is encoded in UTF-8 and sends responses encoded in UTF-8. UTF-8 is backwards compatible with the ASCII charset and its use is consistent with the IETF policy on charsets as defined in BCP 18 [http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄bcp18].


2.1 QUERY FORMAT

By default WhoIs searches domains. To facilitate the queries of other objects keywords must be used. Supported keywords are:
– Domain
– Host⁄Nameserver
– Contact
– Registrar

Keywords are case-insensitive. The rest of the input is the search string. Wildcard chars may be used in search strings to match zero or more chars (%), or match exactly one char(_). Wildcard chars must not be in the first 5 chars.


2.2 RESPONSE FORMAT

The response follows a semi-structured format of object-specific data, followed by query-related meta-information, then a disclaimer.

The object-specific data is represented by key⁄value pairs, beginning with the key, followed by a colon and a space then the value terminated by an ASCII CR & LF. Where no object is found ‘No Data Found’ is returned.

The meta-information is used to identify data freshness and indicate when limits have been exceeded. It appears on one line within ‘〉〉〉’ and ‘〈〈〈’ chars.
The legal disclaimer is presented without leading comment marks wrapped at 72 chars. This format is consistent with that in the registry agreement.


2.3 DOMAIN DATA

Domain data is returned in response to a query with the keyword omitted, or with the ‘domain’ keyword. Domain queries return information on domains that are provisioned in the registry database.
The IDN domains may be specified in either the ASCII-compatible encoded form or the Unicode form. Clients are expected to perform any mappings, in conformance with relevant guidelines such as those specified in RFC5894 and UTS46.

Variant domains may be specified in the search string and WhoIs will match (using case-insensitive comparison) and return information for the primary registered domain.
For queries containing wildcard chars, if only one domain name is matched its details are returned, if more than one domain name is matched then the first 50 matched domain names are listed.


2.3.1 INTERNATIONALISED DOMAIN NAMES
The WhoIs response format, prescribed in Specification 4, does not provide a mechanism to identify active variant domain names. ARI will include active variant domain names in WhoIs responses until a common approach for handling and display of variant names is determined.


2.3.2 RESERVED DOMAIN NAMES
Domain names reserved from allocation will have a specific response that indicates the domain is not registered but also not available.


2.4 NAMESERVER DATA

Nameserver data is returned in response to a query where the ‘nameserver’ or ‘host’ keywords have been used. Nameserver queries return information on hosts that are provisioned in the registry.

The search string for a nameserver query can be either a hostname or IP. Queries using the hostname produce one result unless wildcards are used. Queries using the IP produce one or more results depending on the number of hostnames that match that address. Queries for the hostname are matched case-insensitively.

The quad-dotted notation is expected for IPv4 and the RFC3513 – IPv6 Addressing Architecture format for IPv6. Wildcards cannot be used for IP queries.


2.5 CONTACT DATA

Contact data is returned in response to a query where the ‘contact’ keyword was used. Contact queries return information on contacts that are provisioned in the registry.

The search string for a contact query is the contact identifier. Contact identifiers are matched using a case-insensitive comparison. Wildcards cannot be used.


2.6 REGISTRAR DATA

Registrar data is returned in response to a query where the ‘Registrar’ keyword was used. Registrar queries return information on Registrar objects that are provisioned in the registry.
The search string for a Registrar query can be name or IANA ID. Queries using the name or the IANA ID produce only one result. Queries for the name are matched using a case-insensitive comparison. Wildcards cannot be used.


2.7 NON-STANDARD DATA

The SRS supports domain-related data beyond that above. It may include information used to claim eligibility to participate in the sunrise process, or other arbitrary data collected using the Key-Value Mapping to the EPP. This information will be included in the WhoIs response after the last object-specific data field and before the meta-information.



3 WEB-BASED WHOIS SERVICE

WhoIs is also available via port 80 using HTTP, known as Web-based WhoIs. This interface provides identical query capabilities to the port 43 interface via an HTML form.



4 SECURITY CONTROLS

WhoIs has an in-built mechanism to blacklist malicious users for a specified duration. Blacklisted users are blocked by source IP address and receive a specific blacklisted notification instead of the normal WhoIs response.

Users may be blacklisted if ARI’s monitoring system determines excessive use. A whitelist is used to facilitate legitimate use by law enforcement agencies and other reputable entities.



5 BULK ACCESS

The registry system complies with the requirements for the Periodic Access to Thin Registration Data and Exceptional Access to Thick Registration Data as described in Specification 4.


5.1 PERIODIC ACCESS TO THIN REGISTRATION DATA

ARI shall provide ICANN with Periodic Access to Thin Registration Data. The data will contain the following elements as specified by ICANN. The format of the data will be consistent with the format specified for Data Escrow. The Escrow Format prescribes an XML document encoded in UTF-8. The generated data will be verified to ensure that it is well formed and valid.

The data will be generated every Monday for transactions committed up to and on Sunday unless otherwise directed by ICANN. The generated file will be made available to ICANN using SFTP. Credentials, encryption material, and other parameters will be negotiated between ARI and ICANN using an out-of-band mechanism.


5.2 EXCEPTIONAL ACCESS TO THICK REGISTRATION DATA

If requested by ICANN, ARI shall provide exceptional access to thick registration data for a specified Registrar. The date will contain full information for the following objects:
– Domain names sponsored by the Registrar
– Hosts sponsored by the Registrar
– Contacts sponsored by the Registrar
– Contacts linked from domain names sponsored by the Registrar

As above the format of the data will be consistent with the format specified for Data Escrow. And will be made available to ICANN using SFTP.



6 CAPACITY

ARI’s WhoIs infrastructure is built to sustain 20M domain names. Based on ARI’s experience running a high volume ccTLD registry (.au) and industry analysis, ARI were able to calculate the conservative characteristics of a registry of this size.

Through conservative statistical analysis of the .au registry and data presented in the May 2011 ICANN reports for the .com & .net, .org, .mobi, .info, .biz and .asia [http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄resources⁄registries⁄reports] we know there is:
– An average of 30 SRS txs per domain, per month.
Which indicates an expected monthly transaction volume of 600M txs.
Through statistical analysis of the .au registry and backed up by the data published in the .net RFP responses [http:⁄⁄archive.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄net-rfp⁄net-rfp-public-comments.htm] we also know:
– The peak daily transactions is 6% of the monthly total
– The peak 5 min is 5% of the peak day
Thus we expect a peak WhoIs tx rate of WhoIs 6,000 TPS.
For perspective on the conservativeness of this, the following numbers were taken from data in the May 2011 ICANN reports referenced above:
– .info ~7.8M domain names, peaks at ~1,300 TPS (projected peak TPS of ~3,400 with 20M names).
– .mobi ~1M domain names, peaks at ~150 TPS (projected peak TPS of ~3,000 TPS with 20M names).
– .org ~9.3M domain names, peaks at ~1,300 TPS (projected peak TPS of ~2,800 with 20M names).

ARI understand the limitations of these calculations but they serve as a best estimate of probable transaction load. ARI has built overcapacity of resources to account for limitations of this method, however as conservative numbers were used and these are greater than real world observations, we are confident these capacity numbers are sufficient.

ARI benchmarked their WhoIs infrastructure and used the results to calculate the required computing resources for each of the tiers within the WhoIs architecture – allowing ARI to accurately estimate the required CPU, IOPS, storage and memory requirements for each server within the architecture, as well as the network bandwidth and packet throughput requirements for the anticipated WhoIs traffic. These capacity numbers were then doubled to account for unanticipated traffic spikes, errors in predictions and head room for growth. The technical resource allocations are explored in question 32.

This TLD is projected to reach 1 domains at its peak volume and will generate 0.0003 WhoIs transactions per second. This will consume 0.00001% of the resources of the WhoIs infrastructure. As is evident ARI’s WhoIs can easily accommodate this TLD’s growth plans. See attachment ‘Q26 – Registry Scale Estimates & Resource Allocation.xlsx’ for more information.

ARI expects to provide Registry services to 100 TLDs and a total of 12M domains by end of 2014. With all the TLDs and domains combined, ARI’s WhoIs infrastructure will be only 60% utilized. The WhoIs infrastructure capacity can also be easily scaled as described in question 32



7 ARCHITECTURE

WhoIs uses a database separate from the SRS database as it operates from the secondary site such that network and database resources are decoupled from the operation of the SRS. Oracle Data Guard ensures the two databases are synchronised in real-time. The WhoIs service is operated live from the SRS ‘failover’ site, with the SRS ‘primary’ site serving as the ‘failover’ site for the WhoIs service. Both sites have enough capacity to run both services simultaneously, however by separating them, in normal operating modes headroom above the already over provisioned capacity is available. The architecture and data flow diagrams are described below and shown in the attachment ‘Q26 – WhoIs.pdf’.

Traffic enters the network from the Internet through border routers and then firewalls. All traffic destined for this service except for TCP ports 43, 80 & 443 is blocked. Load balancers forward the request to one of the application servers running ARI built WhoIs software. Each server is connected to the database cluster through another firewall. Each server uses a restricted Oracle user that has read only access to the registry data and can only access the data that is relevant to the WhoIs queries. This ensures that in the unlikely event of an application server compromise the effects are limited.

All components are configured and provisioned to provide N+1 redundancy. Multiple Internet providers with separate upstream bandwidth suppliers are used. At least one additional component of all hardware exists, enabling maintenance without downtime. This configuration provides a service exceeding the availability requirements in Specification 10.

The use of load balancing allows addition of application servers with no downtime. From a database perspective, the ability to scale is enabled by utilising Oracle RAC database clustering. The entire service, including routers, firewalls and application is IPv6 compatible and WhoIs is offered on both IPv4 and IPv6. Detail about this architecture is available in our response to Question 32.


7.1 SYNCHRONISATION

The WhoIs database is synchronised with the SRS database using Oracle Data Guard. Committed transactions in the SRS database are reflected in the WhoIs database in real-time. Should synchronisation break, WhoIs continues to operate with the latest available data until the issue is reconciled. The channel between the two sites consists of two independent dedicated point to point links as well as the Internet. Replication traffic flows via the dedicated links or if both links fail replication traffic flows over Internet tunnels.


7.2. INTERCONNECTIVITY WITH OTHER SERVICES

The WhoIs service is not directly interconnected with other registry services or systems. The software has been developed to provide the WhoIs service exclusively and retrieve response information from a database physically separate to the SRS transactional database. This database is updated as described in ‘Synchronisation’ above. Although for smaller system the WhoIs and SRS can be configured to use the same data store. The WhoIs servers log every request to a central repository that is logically separate from the WhoIs database. This repository is used for query counts, detection of data mining and statistical analysis on query trends.


7.3 IT AND INFRASTRUCTURE RESOURCES

The WhoIs service is provided utilizing Cisco networking equipment, IBM servers & SAN. They are described in the attachment ‘Q26 – WhoIs.pdf’. For more information on the architecture including server specifications and database capabilities please see Questions 32 & 33.



8 COMPLIANCE

Compliance with WhoIs RFCs is achieved through design and QA. The WhoIs interface was designed to conform to the RFCs as documented and independent test cases have been developed.

QA processes provide confidence that any changes to the service don’t result in regression of the WhoIs. Automated build processes execute test suites that ensure every facet of the WhoIs service (including malformed input, commands sequencing and synchronisation, and boundary values) is covered and compliant with RFCs. These tests are executed prior to the committing of code and nightly. The final deliverable is packaged and tested again to ensure no defects were introduced in the packaging of the software.

New versions of the WhoIs follow a deployment schedule. The new version is deployed into an OT&E environment for Registrar integration testing. Registrars who rely on WhoIs functionality are encouraged during this stage to test their systems operate without change. After a fixed time in OT&E without issue, new versions are scheduled for production deployment. This ensures incompatibilities with RFCs that made it through QA processes are detected in test environments prior to reaching production.

ARI is committed to providing a WhoIs service that integrates with third party tools and as such tests are conducted using these tools such as jWhoIs, a popular UNIX command line WhoIs client. Any issues identified during integration fall into 1 of the following categories:
– Third-party tool not compliant with the WhoIs specification
– WhoIs service not compliant
– Both third-party tool and WhoIs service are compliant, however another operational issue causes a problem

Defects are raised and follow the change management. Change requests may also be raised to promote integration of third-party tools and to meet common practice.



9 RESOURCES

This function will be performed by ARI. The WhoIs system is supported by a number of ARI departments:
– Products and Consulting Team (7 staff)
– Production Support Group (27 staff)
– Development Team (11 staff)
– Legal, Abuse and Compliance Team (6 staff)

A detailed list of the departments, roles and responsibilities in ARI is provided as attachment ‘Q26 – ARI Background & Roles.pdf’. This attachment describes the functions of the above teams and the exact number and nature of staff within.

The number of resources required to design, build, operate and support the SRS does not vary significantly with, and is not linearly proportional to, the number or size of TLDs that ARI provides registry services to.

ARI provides registry backend services to 5 TLDs and has a wealth of experience in estimating the number of resources required to support a registry system.

Based on past experience ARI estimates that the existing staff is adequate to support a registry system that supports in excess of 50M domains. Since this TLD projects 1 domains, 0.000002% of these resources are allocated to this TLD. See attachment ‘Q26 – Registry Scale Estimates & Resource Allocation.xlsx’ for more information.

ARI protects against loss of critical staff by employing multiple people in each role. Staff members have a primary role plus a secondary role for protection against personnel absence. Additionally ARI can scale resources as required. Additional trained resources can be added to any of the above teams with a 2 month lead time.

The products and consulting team is responsible for product management of the WhoIs solution including working with clients and the industry to identify new features or changes required to the system. The team consists of:
– 1 Products and Consulting Manager
– 1 Product Manager
– 1 Technical Product Manager
– 4 Domain Name Industry Consultants

ARI employ a development team responsible for the maintenance and continual improvement of the WhoIs software. The team consists of:
– 1 Development Manager
– 2 Business Analysts
– 6 Developers
– 2 Quality Analysts

ARI’s Production Support Team ensures the successful operation of the WhoIs system. The team comprises Database Administrators, Systems Administrators and Network Administrators. This team routinely checks and monitors bandwidth, disk and CPU usages to plan and respond to expected increases in the volume of queries, and perform maintenance of the system including security patches and failover and recovery testing. The team consists of:
– Production Support Manager
– Service Desk:
– 1 Level 1 Support Team Lead
– 8 Customer Support Representatives (Level 1 support)
– 1 Level 2 Support Team Lead
– 4 Registry Specialists (Level 2 support)
– Operations (Level 3 support)
– 1 Operations Team Lead
– 2 Systems Administrators
– 2 Database Administrators
– 2 Network Engineers
– Implementation
– 1 Project Manager
– 2 Systems Administrators
– 1 Database Administrators
– 1 Network Engineers

ARI’s registry provides abuse monitoring detection mechanisms to block data mining. ARI support staff may be contacted to remove blacklisted users during which they may be referred to the Legal, Abuse and Compliance Team for evaluation of their activities. Additionally the support team in conjunction with the Legal, Abuse and Compliance team administer requests for listing on the whitelist. The team consists of:
– 1 Legal Manager
– 1 Legal Counsel
– 4 Policy Compliance Officers

These resources sufficiently accommodate the needs of this TLD, and are included in ARI’s fees as described in our Financial responses.

27. Registration Life Cycle

We have engaged ARI Registry Services (ARI) to deliver services for this TLD. ARI provide registry services for a number of TLDs including the .au ccTLD. For more background information on ARI please see the attachment ‘Q27 – ARI Background & Roles.pdf’. This response describes the Registration Lifecycle as implemented by ARI.

1 INTRODUCTION
The lifecycle described matches current gTLD registries. All states, grace periods and transitions are supported by the EPP protocol as described in RFC5730 – 5734 & the Grace Period Mapping published in RFC3915. An overview is in attachment ‘Q27 – Registration Lifecycle.pdf’.

2 REGISTRATION PERIODS
The registry supports registration up to 10 years and renewals for 1 to 10 years. The total current validity period can’t exceed 10 years.
Transfers under part A of the ICANN Policy on Transfer of Registrations between Registrars (Adopted 7 November 2008) extend registration by 1 year. The period truncates to 10 years if required.

3 STATES
The states that a domain can exist in are: Registered, Pending Transfer, Redemption, Pending Restore & Pending Delete.
All domain name statuses (RFC3915, 5730-5734 and 5910) are covered below

3.1 REGISTERED
EPP Status: ok
In DNS: Yes
Allowed Operations: Update, Renew, Transfer (request) & Delete
The default state of a domain – no pending operations. The sponsoring Registrar may update the domain.

3.2 PENDING TRANSFER
EPP Status: pendingTransfer
In DNS: Yes
Allowed Operations: Transfer (cancel, reject, approve)
Another Registrar has requested transfer of the domain and it is not yet completed All transform operations, other than those to cancel, reject, or approve the transfer are rejected.

3.3 REDEMPTION
EPP Status: pendingDelete
RGP Status: redemptionPeriod
In DNS: No
Allowed Operations: Restore (request)
Domain has been deleted. The sponsor may request restoration of the domain. The domain continues to be withheld from the DNS unless it is restored. No transform operations other than restore are allowed.

3.4 PENDING RESTORE
EPP Status: pendingDelete
RGP Status: pendingRestore
In DNS: Yes
Allowed Operations: Restore (report)
A restore request is pending. The sponsor must submit a restore report. The domain is provisioned in the DNS. No transform operations other than the restore report are allowed.

3.5 PENDING DELETE
EPP Status: pendingDelete
RGP Status: pendingDelete
In DNS: No
Allowed Operations: None
The Redemption Grace Period has lapsed and the domain is pending purge from the registry. This state prohibits the sponsor from updating, restoring or modifying the domain. This status applies for 5 days. At the end of this period the domain is purged from the database and made available for registration.

4 GRACE PERIODS
The registry system supports 4 grace periods: add, renew, auto-renew, and transfer, described below with consideration for overlap of grace periods. States described here are additional to those above.

4.1 ADD GRACE PERIOD
Length: 5 days
RGP Status: addPeriod
Allows for the no-cost cancellation of a domain registration resulting from typing mistakes and other errors by Registrars and registrants – beginning on the creation of a domain and lasting for 5 days. When the following operations are performed during this period these rules apply:
– Delete: the sponsoring Registrar, who must have created the domain, may delete the domain and receive a refund. The domain is deleted with immediate effect. The refund is subject to the Add Grace Period Limits consensus policy. Excess deletions over 50 or 10% of creates (whichever is greater), are not subject to a refund, except in extraordinary circumstances.
– Renew: the sponsor may renew the domain but does not receive any refund for the initial registration fee. The Registrar is charged for the renewal operation. The total period for the domain is the sum of the initial period in the create and any renewal term, limited to a 10 year maximum.
– Transfer: Under ICANN policy a transfer can’t occur during the Add Grace Period or at any other time in the first 60 days after the initial registration. The registry system enforces this, rejecting such requests.
– Bulk Transfers: Under Part B of the ICANN Policy on Transfer of Registrations between Registrars, a bulk transfer can occur during the Add Grace Period. Any bulk transfer causes the Add Grace Period to not apply.
The Add Grace Period does not have any impact on other commands.

4.2 RENEW GRACE PERIOD
Length: 5 days
RGP Status: renewPeriod
Allows the sponsoring Registrar to undo a renewal via the deletion of a domain – beginning on the receipt of a renewal command and lasting for 5 days. If any of the following operations are performed during this period these rules apply:
– Delete: the sponsoring Registrar, who must have initiated the renewal, may delete the domain and receive a renewal fee refund. The extension to the registration period caused by the preceding renew is reversed and unless the domain is also in the Add Grace Period, the domain enters the Redemption state. If also in the Add Grace Period it is deleted with immediate effect and availability for registration.
– Renew: the sponsoring Registrar, who must have performed the initial renew, can subsequently renew the domain again, causing a second independent Renewal Grace Period to start. The Registrar is charged for the operation and the total registration period for the domain is extended by the renewal term, limited to the 10 year maximum.
– Transfer: an approved transfer command ends the current Renew Grace Period without a refund and begins a Transfer Grace Period.
– Bulk Transfers: bulk transfers cause the Renew Grace Period to end without a refund; consequently registration periods are not changed.
The Renew Grace Period has no impact on other commands.

4.3 AUTO-RENEW GRACE PERIOD
Length: 45 days
RGP Status: autoRenewPeriod
Auto-Renew Grace Period allows for domains to remain in the DNS past registration expiration while giving adequate time for the sponsoring Registrar to obtain intention of renewal from the registrant.
This period begins on the expiration of the domain and lasts for 45 days. If any of the following are performed during this period these rules apply:
– Delete: the sponsoring Registrar, who must have been the sponsor when the Auto-Renew Grace Period commenced, may delete the domain and receive an auto-renew fee refund. The registration period auto-renew extension is reversed and the domain enters the Redemption state.
– Renew: the sponsoring Registrar, who must have been the sponsor when the auto-renew occurred, can renew the domain again causing an independent Renewal Grace Period to begin. The Registrar is charged and the registration period is extended by the renewal term, limited to the 10 year maximum.
– Transfer: an approved transfer command ends the current Auto-Renew Grace Period with a refund to the losing Registrar and begins a Transfer Grace Period. The registration period auto-renew extension is reversed and the registration is extended by the period specified in the transfer.
– Bulk Transfers: bulk transfers cause the Auto-Renew Grace Period to end without a refund; consequently registration periods are not changed.
The Auto-Renew Grace Period does not have any impact on other commands.

4.4 TRANSFER GRACE PERIOD
Length: 5 days
RGP Status: transferPeriod
Transfer Grace Period allows the sponsoring Registrar to undo the registration period extension (due to a transfer command), via the deletion of a domain. This period begins on transfer completion and lasts for 5 calendar days. If the following are performed during the period these rules apply:
– Delete: the sponsoring Registrar, who must have initiated the transfer, may delete the domain and receive a transfer fee refund. The extension to the registration period of the preceding transfer is reversed and the Redemption state is entered.
– Renew: the sponsoring Registrar can renew the domain thus causing an independent Renewal Grace Period to begin. The Registrar is charged and the registration period for the domain is extended by the renewal term, limited to the 10 year maximum.
– Transfer: under Part A of the ICANN Policy on Transfer of Registrations between Registrars a transfer may not occur during the 60 day period after transfer (except in special circumstances). The registry system enforces this – effects of transfer do not require consideration. Should a special situation require transfer back to the losing Registrar, this is dealt with by taking into account the specific situation. The registry system does not allow this without intervention by registry staff.
– Bulk Transfers: bulk transfers cause the Transfer Grace Period to end without a refund; consequently registration periods are not changed.
The Transfer Grace Period does not have any impact on other commands.

4.5 REDEMPTION GRACE PERIOD
Length: 30 days
RGP Status: as described in Redemption state
Redemption Grace Period refers to the period of time the domain spends in the Redemption state, starting after a domain is deleted. The Redemption state description provides information on operations during this period.

4.6 OVERLAP OF GRACE PERIODS
The 4 possible overlapping grace periods are:
– Add Grace Period with 1 or more Renew Grace Periods.
– Renew Grace Period with 1 or more other Renew Grace Periods.
– Transfer Grace Period with 1 or more Renew Grace Periods.
– Auto-Renew Grace Period with 1 or more Renew Grace Periods.
These are treated independently with respect to timelines however action that is taken has the combined effects of all grace periods still current.

4.6.1 TRANSFER CLARIFICATION
If several billable operations, including a transfer, are performed on a domain and it is deleted in the operations’ grace periods, only those operations performed after⁄including the latest transfer are eligible for refund.

5 TRANSITIONS

5.1 AVAILABLE 〉 REGISTERED
Triggered by the receipt of a create command to register the domain. The sponsoring Registrar is charged for the creation amount. This transition begins the Add Grace Period.

5.2 REGISTERED 〉 PENDING TRANSFER
Triggered by the receipt of a request transfer command. The transfer must result in domain registration extension – the gaining Registrar is charged for the transfer. Requests to transfer the domain within 60 days of creation or a previous transfer are rejected. As per ‘4.4 Transfer Grace Period’, exceptions specified in ICANN’s Transfer Policy apply – these are dealt with individually.

5.3 PENDING TRANSFER 〉 REGISTERED
Triggered by 1 of 4 operations:
– Operation 1 (Cancel): during the Pending Transfer period the gaining Registrar may cancel the transfer by issuing a cancel transfer command. The gaining Registrar is refunded the transfer fee, the registration period remains unchanged and all existing grace periods at the time of transfer request remain in effect.
– Operation 2 (Reject): during the Pending Transfer period the losing Registrar may reject the transfer by issuing a reject transfer command. The gaining Registrar is refunded the transfer. The registration period remains unchanged and all grace periods existing at the time of transfer request remain in effect if not elapsed.
– Operation 3 (Approve): During the Pending Transfer period the losing Registrar may approve the transfer by issuing an approve transfer command. If the transfer was requested during the Auto-Renew Grace Period, the extension to the registration period is reversed and the losing Registrar is refunded the auto-renew. The registration period is extended by the amount specified in the transfer request. This begins the Transfer Grace Period.
– Operation 4 (Auto-Approve): If after 5 days no action has been taken, the system approves the transfer. If the transfer was requested during the Auto-Renew Grace Period the extension to the registration period is reversed and the losing Registrar is refunded the auto-renew. The registration period is extended by the amount specified in the transfer request. This begins the Transfer Grace Period.

5.4 REGISTERED 〉 DELETED
On receipt of a delete command if the domain is in the Add Grace Period, it is purged from the Database and immediately available for registration. Renew Grace Period may also be in effect.

5.5 REGISTERED 〉 REDEMPTION
On receipt of a delete command if the domain is not in the Add Grace Period, it transitions to the Redemption Period state and all grace periods in effect are considered.

5.6 REDEMPTION 〉 PENDING RESTORE
On receipt of a restore command if the Redemption Period has not lapsed, the domain transitions to the Pending Restore state. The domain is provisioned in the DNS. The sponsoring Registrar is charged a fee for the restore request.

5.7 PENDING RESTORE 〉 REGISTERED
During the Pending Restore period the sponsoring Registrar may complete the restore via a restore report containing the WhoIs information submitted prior to the deletion, the WhoIs information at the time of the report, and the reason for the restoration.

5.8 PENDING RESTORE 〉 REDEMPTION
Seven calendar days after the transition to the Pending Restore state, if no restore report is received the domain transitions to the Redemption state, which begins a new redemption period. The domain is removed from the DNS. The restore has no refund.

5.9 REDEMPTION 〉 PENDING DELETE
Thirty calendar days after the transition to the Redemption state, if no restore request is received the domain transitions to the Pending Delete state.

5.10 PENDING DELETE 〉 DELETED
Five calendar days after the transition to the Pending Delete state, the domain is removed from the Database and is immediately available for registration.

6 LOCKS
Locks may be applied to the domain to prevent specific operations occurring. The sponsoring Registrar may set the locks prefixed with ‘client’ while locks prefixed with ‘server’ are added and removed by the registry operator. Locks are added and removed independently but they can be combined to facilitate the enforcement of higher processes, such as ‘Registrar Lock’, and outcomes required as part of UDRP. All locks are compatible with EPP RFCs. The available locks are:
– clientDeleteProhibited, serverDeleteProhibited – Requests to delete the object are rejected
– clientHold, serverHold – DNS information is not published
– clientRenewProhibited, serverRenewProhibited – Requests to renew the object are rejected. Auto-renew is allowed
– clientTransferProhibited, serverTransferProhibited – Requests to transfer the object are rejected
– clientUpdateProhibited, serverUpdateProhibited – Requests to update the object are rejected, unless the update removes this status

7 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

7.1 ICANN-APPROVED BULK TRANSFERS
ICANN-Approved Bulk Transfers do not follow the typical transfer lifecycle. Existing grace periods are invalidated and no refunds are credited to the losing Registrar. The prohibition of transfer period on domains created or transferred within 60 days does not apply.

7.2 UNIFORM RAPID SUSPENSION
In the Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) process, as described in the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ 11th January 2012, the following modification to the above processes is required:
Remedy allows for the addition of a year to the registration period, limited to the 10 year maximum. During this time no transform operations may be performed other than to restore the domain as allowed by Appeal. At the expiration of the registration period the domain is not automatically renewed, but proceeds to the Redemption state as per the lifecycle described above, and is not eligible for restoration.

8 UPDATE⁄DNS
The update command does not impact the state of the domain through the Registration Lifecycle, however the command can be used to add and remove delegation information, which changes the DNS state of the domain.
A domain is required to have 2 or more nameservers published in the DNS. An update that results in a domain having less than 2 nameservers removes the domain from the DNS. An exception is when 1 nameserver, remains assigned to a domain due to deletion of its other nameservers due to purge of their parent domain. The next update that modifies delegation information ends the exception and from then on the domain requires 2 nameservers be in the DNS.

9 RESOURCES
This function will be performed by ARI. ARI’s registry performs all time-based transitions automatically and enforces all other business rules without requiring human resources for normal operation. If changes to the automatic behaviours or restrictions enforced by the policy system are required, ARI has a development team for this.
Domain Name Lifecycle aspects requiring human resources management included in the ARI outsourcing include:
– Processing Add Grace Period exemptions as requested by Registrars.
– Processing restore reports provided by Registrars.
– Meeting the registry operator’s obligations under ICANN’s Transfer Dispute Policy.
– Performing exception processing in the case of approved transfers during the 60 day transfer prohibition window.
The Registration Lifecycle is designed, built, operated and supported by these ARI departments:
– Products and Consulting Team (7 staff)
– Legal, Abuse and Compliance Team (6 staff)
– Development Team (11 staff)
A detailed list of the departments, roles and responsibilities in ARI is provided as the attachment ‘Q27 – ARI Background & Roles.pdf’. This attachment describes the functions of the above teams and the exact number and nature of staff within.
The number of resources required to design, build, operate and support the SRS does not vary significantly with, and is not linearly proportional to, the number or size of TLDs to which ARI provides registry services.
ARI provides registry backend services to 5 TLDs and has a wealth of experience in estimating the number of resources required to support a registry system.
Based on past experience ARI estimates that the existing staff is adequate to support a registry system that supports in excess of 50M domains. Since this TLD projects 1 domains, 0.000002% of these resources are allocated to this TLD. See attachment ‘Q27 – Registry Scale Estimates & Resource Allocation.xlsx’ for more information.
ARI protects against loss of critical staff by employing multiple people in each role. Staff members have a primary role plus a secondary role for protection against personnel absence. Additionally ARI can scale resources as required. Additional trained resources can be added to any of the above teams with a 2 month lead time.
The Products and Consulting team is responsible for product management of the Registration Lifecycle, including working with clients and the industry to identify new features or changes required to the system. The team consists of:
– 1 Products and Consulting Manager
– 1 Product Manager
– 1 Technical Product Manager
– 4 Domain Name Industry Consultants
Most manual tasks fall to the Legal, Abuse and Compliance team, with staff experienced in development of policy for policy rich TLD environments. They have the required legal and industry background to perform this function. The team consists of:
– 1 Legal Manager
– 1 Legal Counsel
– 4 Policy Compliance Officers
The automated aspects of the Registration lifecycle are supported by ARI’s Domain Name Registry software. ARI has a development team for maintenance and improvement of the software. The team consist of:
– 1 Development Manager
– 2 Business Analysts
– 6 Developers
– 2 Quality Analysts
Information on these roles is in Resources in our response to Question 31. These resources sufficiently accommodate the needs of this TLD, and are included in ARI’s fees as described in our Financial responses.

28. Abuse Prevention and Mitigation

ANZ’s proposed use for .anz should, by its very nature, preclude abusive registrations from occurring, as all domains names will only be registered in the name of ANZ and its affiliates (for the purposes of this response, “affiliates” means in relation to a party any corporation or other business entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control of that party and for the purposes of this definition, a corporation or other business entity shall be deemed to control another corporation or business entity if it owns directly or indirectly (i) fifty percent (50%) or more of the voting securities or voting interest in any such corporation or other entity; or (ii) fifty percent (50%) or more of the interest in the profit or income in the case of a business entity other than a corporation; or (iii) in the case of a partnership, any other compatible interest equal to at least a fifty percent (50%) share in the general partner).

ANZ intends to operate .anz for the benefit of Internet users that elect to interact with ANZ and its affiliates and, therefore there is no incentive for ANZ to seek to confuse Internet users, nor otherwise use any domain name in the .anz domain space in bad faith, since ANZ’s branded keyword gTLD is inherently intertwined with all uses of the .anz domain names.

As stated in response to Question 18, ANZ’s registration policy will address the minimum requirements mandated by ICANN including rights abuse prevention measures. ANZ will implement its draft registration policy as means of abuse prevention and mitigation ** (see end of document).

ANZ will develop, implement and maintain a clear written policy which requires the relevant corporate authorisation and approvals to be procured and evidenced in order for any .anz domain name to be registered for ANZ’s corporate use. In the event that ANZ resolves to permit third parties (other than affiliates) that have a relationship with either ANZ or its business, to register (or license) and use domain names within the .anz domain, additional and reasonably necessary corporate authorisations and approvals may be required to ensure internal responsibility for permitting and enforcing the terms of use of the .anz domain. In addition to any such written policies, all registered domain names within the .anz domain space will be regularly monitored for abusive use.


ANZ has engaged ARI Registry Services (ARI) to deliver registry services for the .anz domain.

This section of the response describes the policy of Abuse Prevention and Mitigation as implemented in ARI’s Managed TLD Registry Service.

The efforts that will be undertaken in ANZ’s .anz domain space to minimise abusive registrations and other activities that have a negative impact on Internet users are described below. ANZ will be utilising the Anti-Abuse service of its elected Managed Registry Service provider ARI. This service includes the implementation of ANZ’s comprehensive Anti-Abuse policy, developed in consultation with ARI, which clearly defines abusive behaviour, identifies particular types of abusive behaviour and the mitigation response that we will initiate when abusive behaviour is determined.

ARI will, owing to their extensive industry experience and established Anti-Abuse operations, implement and manage on ANZ’s behalf various procedures and measures adopted to mitigate the potential for abuse, identify abuse and handle identified abuse. ARI will forward to ANZ all matters requiring determination by the Registry Operator which fall beyond the scope of ARI’s Anti-Abuse functions as defined by reference to the implementation of the Anti-Abuse Policy.

Despite utilisation of the ARI Anti Abuse service ANZ is nonetheless cognisant of its responsibility to minimise abusive registrations and other activities that have a negative impact on Internet users in the .anz domain space. In recognition of this responsibility, ANZ will play an instrumental role in overseeing the implementation of the Anti Abuse service by ARI as well as having contractual commitments in the form of SLA’s in place to ensure that ARI’s delivery of the Anti Abuse service is aligned with ANZ’s strong commitment to minimise abuse in the .anz domain space.



1. INTRODUCTION

The following is a description of ARI’s Abuse Services. Please note that the various policies and practices that ANZ will implemented to minimise abusive registrations and other activities that affect the rights of trademark holders are specifically described in ANZ’s response to Question 29.



2. POLICY

In consultation with ARI ANZ has developed a comprehensive Anti-Abuse Policy, which is the main instrument that captures ANZ’s strategy in relation to abuse in the .anz domain space.


2.1. DEFINITION OF ABUSE

Abusive behaviour in a TLD may relate to the core domain name related activities performed by registrars and registries including, but not limited to:
- The allocation of registered domain names;

- The maintenance of and access to registration information;

- The transfer, deletion, and reallocation of domain names; or

- The manner in which the registrant uses the domain name upon creation.


Challenges arise in attempting to define abusive behaviour in the .anz domain due to its broad scope. Defining abusive behaviour by reference to the stage in the domain name lifecycle in which the behaviour occurs presents difficulty given that a particular type of abuse may occur at various stages of the life cycle.

With this in mind, ARI has fully adopted the definition of abuse developed by the Registration Abuse Policies Working Group (Registration Abuse Policies Working Group Final Report 2010), which does not focus on any particular stage in the domain name life cycle.

Abusive behaviour in a TLD may be defined as an action that:

- causes actual and substantial harm, or is a material predicate of such harm; or

- is illegal or illegitimate, or is otherwise considered contrary to the intention and design of the mission⁄purpose of the TLD.



IN APPLYING THIS DEFINITION THE FOLLOWING MUST BE NOTED:

(1) The party or parties harmed, and the severity and immediacy of the abuse, should be identified in relation to the specific alleged abuse.

(2) The term ʺharmʺ is not intended to shield a party from fair market competition.

(3) A predicate is a related action or enabler. There must be a clear link between the predicate and the abuse, and justification enough to address the abuse by addressing the predicate (enabling action).


For example, Whois data can be used in ways that cause harm to domain name Registrants, intellectual property rights holders and internet users. Harmful actions may include the generation of spam, the abuse of personal data, intellectual property infringement, loss of reputation or identity theft, loss of data, phishing and other cybercrime-related exploits, harassment, stalking, or other activity with negative personal or economic consequences. Examples of predicates to these harmful actions are automated email harvesting, domain name registration by proxy⁄privacy services to aid wrongful activity, support of false or misleading registrant data, and the use of Whois data to develop large email lists for commercial purposes. The misuse of Whois data is therefore considered abusive because it is contrary to the intention and design of the stated legitimate purpose of Whois data.



2.2. AIMS AND OVERVIEW OF ANZ’S ANTI-ABUSE POLICY

ANZ’s Anti-Abuse Policy will put Registrants on notice of the ways in which ANZ will identify and respond to abuse and serve as a deterrent to those seeking to register and use domain names for abusive purposes. The policy will be made easily accessible on the Abuse page of ANZ’s Registry website which will be accessible and have clear links from the home page along with FAQs and contact information for reporting abuse.


ANZ’S POLICY:

- Defines abusive behaviour in the .anz domain space;

- Identifies types of actions that constitute abusive behaviour consistent with ANZ’s adoption of the Registration Abuse Policies Working Group definition of ‘abuse’;

- Classifies abusive behaviours based on the severity and immediacy of the harm caused;

- Identifies how abusive behaviour can be notified to ANZ and the steps that ANZ will take to determine whether the notified behaviour is abusive; and

- Identifies the actions that ANZ may take in response to behaviour determined to be abusive.
ANZ will include the following text in the Registry-Registrar Agreement (RRA) which will oblige all registrants to comply with the Anti Abuse Policy:



COMPLIANCE WITH TERMS AND CONDITIONS:

The Registrar shall comply with each of the following requirements, and further shall include in its registration agreement with each Registrant, as applicable, an obligation for each Registrant to comply with each of the following requirements:

‘operational standards, policies, procedures, and practices for the .anz domain established from time to time by the Registry Operator in a non-arbitrary manner and applicable to all Registrars, including affiliates of the Registry Operator, and consistent with ICANNʹs standards, policies, procedures, and practices and the Registry Operator’s Registry Agreement with ICANN. Additional or revised Registry Operator operational standards, policies, procedures, and practices for the .anz domain shall be effective upon thirty days notice by the Registry Operator to Registrar. If there is a discrepancy between the terms required by this Agreement and the terms of the Registrar’s registration agreement, the terms of this Agreement shall supersede those of the Registrar’s registration agreement’



2.3. ANTI-ABUSE POLICY

ANZ’S ANTI-ABUSE POLICY IS AS FOLLOWS:


INTRODUCTION:

The abusive registration and use of domain names in the .anz domain space is not tolerated given that the inherent nature of such abuses creates security and stability issues for all participants in the Internet environment.



DEFINITION OF ABUSIVE BEHAVIOUR:

Abusive behaviour is an action that:

- causes actual and substantial harm, or is a material predicate of such harm; or

- is illegal or illegitimate, or is otherwise considered contrary to the intention and design of the mission⁄purpose of the TLD.


A ‘predicate’ is an action or enabler of a harm.
‘Material’ means that something is consequential or significant.



Examples of abusive behaviour falling within this definition:

- Spam: the use of electronic messaging systems to send unsolicited bulk messages. The term applies to e-mail spam and similar abuses such as instant messaging spam, mobile messaging spam, and the spamming of web sites and Internet forums. An example, for purposes of illustration, would be the use of email in denial-of-service attacks;

- Phishing: the use of a fraudulently presented web site to deceive Internet users into divulging sensitive information such as usernames, passwords or financial data;

- Pharming: the redirecting of unknowing users to fraudulent web sites or services, typically through DNS hijacking or poisoning, in order to deceive Internet users into divulging sensitive information such as usernames, passwords or financial data;

- Wilful distribution of malware: the dissemination of software designed to infiltrate or cause damage to devices or to collect confidential data from users without the owner’s informed consent;

- Fast Flux hosting: the use of DNS to frequently change the location on the Internet to which the domain name of an Internet host or name server resolves in order to disguise the location of web sites or other Internet services, or to avoid detection and mitigation efforts, or to host illegal activities. Fast flux hosting may only be used with prior permission of the Registry Operator;

- Botnet command and control: the development and use of a command, agent, motor, service or software which is implemented: (1) to remotely control the computer or computer system of an Internet user without their knowledge or consent, (2) to generate direct denial of service (DDOS) attacks;

- Distribution of child pornography: the storage, publication, display and⁄or dissemination of pornographic materials depicting individuals under the age of majority in the relevant jurisdiction;

- Illegal access to Other Computers or Networks: the illegal accessing of computers, accounts, or networks belonging to another party, or attempt to penetrate security measures of another individual’s system (hacking) together with any activity that might be used as a precursor to an attempted system penetration.



DETECTION OF ABUSIVE BEHAVIOUR:

Abusive behaviour in the .anz domain space may be detected in the following ways:

- By ANZ through its on-going monitoring activities and industry participation; and

- By third parties (general public, law enforcement, government agencies, industry partners) through notification submitted to the abuse point of contact on ANZ’s website or industry alerts.




HANDLING OF ABUSIVE BEHAVIOUR:

When abusive behaviour is detected in the .anz domain space through notification by a third party, a preliminary assessment will be performed in order to determine whether the notification is legitimately made. Applying the definitions of types of abusive behaviours identified in this policy, ANZ will classify each incidence of legitimately reported abuse into one of two categories based on the probable severity and immediacy of harm to registrants and Internet users. These categories are provided below and are defined by reference to the action that may be taken by ANZ. The examples of types of abusive behaviour falling within each category are illustrative only.


CATEGORY 1:
Probable Severity or Immediacy of Harm - Low
Examples of types of abusive behaviour – Spam, Malware

Mitigation steps -
1. Investigate
2. Notify registrant



CATEGORY 2:
Probable Severity or Immediacy of Harm - Medium to High
Examples of types of abusive behaviour – Fast Flux Hosting, Phishing, Illegal Access to other Computers or Networks, Pharming, Botnet command and control

Mitigation steps -
1. Suspend domain name
2. Investigate
3. Restore or terminate domain name


In the event that ANZ receives specific instructions regarding a domain name from a law enforcement agency, government or quasi government agency utilising the expedited process (see section 3.3.2.2.1) for such agencies, ANZ’s mitigation steps will be in accordance with those instructions provided that they do not result in the contravention of applicable law. In addition, the


ANZ will make all reasonable efforts to notify law enforcement agencies of abusive behaviour in the .anz domain space which ANZ believes may constitute evidence of the commission of a crime e.g. distribution of child pornography.


Note that these expected actions are intended to provide a guide to ANZ’s response to abusive behaviour rather than any guarantee that a particular action will be taken.


The identification of abusive behaviour in the .anz domain, as defined above, shall give ANZ the right, but not the obligation, to take such actions in accordance with the following text in the RRA which provides that the Registry Operator:


‘reserves the right to deny, cancel or transfer any registration or transaction, or place any domain name(s) on registry lock, hold or similar status, that ANZ deems necessary, in itsdiscretion to;

1. protect the integrity and stability of the Registry;

2. comply with any applicable laws, government rules or requirements, requests of law enforcement, or any dispute resolution process;

3. avoid any liability, civil or criminal, on the part of the Registry Operator, as well as its affiliates, subsidiaries, officers, directors, and employees;

4. per the terms of the registration agreement;

5. correct mistakes made by the Registry Operator or any Registrar in connection with a domain name registration.’


ANZ reserves the right to place upon registry lock, hold or similar status a domain name during resolution of a dispute.

ANZ also reserves the right to deny registration of a domain name to a registrant who has repeatedly engaged in abusive behaviour in ANZ’s domain space or any other TLD.

Registrars only and not Resellers may offer proxy registration services to private individuals using the domain name for non-commercial purposes.

ANZ may amend or otherwise modify this policy to keep abreast of changes in consensus policy or new and emerging types of abusive behaviour in the Internet.

Registrar’s failure to comply with this Anti-Abuse Policy shall constitute a material breach of the RRA, and shall give rise to the rights and remedies available to ANZ under the RRA.



3. ABUSE PREVENTION AND MITIGATION

This section describes the implementation of ANZ’s abuse related processes regarding:

- Building awareness of the Anti-Abuse Policy;

- Mitigating the potential for abusive behaviour;

- Identifying abusive behaviour; and

- Handling abusive behaviour.


3.1. AWARENESS OF POLICY

The Anti-Abuse Policy will be published on the abuse page of ANZ’s Registry website which will be accessible and have clear links from the home page. In addition, the URL to the Abuse page will be included in all email correspondence to the registrant, thereby placing all registrants on notice of the applicability of the Anti-Abuse Policy to all domain names registered in the .anz domain space. The abuse page of ANZ’s Registry website will emphasise and evidence its commitment to combating abusive registrations by clearly identifying what ANZ’s policy on abuse is and what effect ANZ’s implementation of the policy may have on registrants. ANZ anticipate that the clear message, which communicates ANZ’s commitment to combating abusive registrations, will serve to minimise abusive registrations in the .anz domain space.



3.2. PRE-EMPTIVE – MITIGATING OF THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE

The following practices and procedures will be adopted to mitigate the potential for abusive behaviour in the .anz domain.



3.2.1. ICANN PRESCRIBED MEASURES

In accordance with ANZ’s obligations as a Registry Operator ANZ will comply with all requirements in the ‘gTLD ANZ Guidebook’. In particular, ANZ will comply with the following measures prescribed by ICANN which serve to mitigate the potential for abuse in the .anz domain:

- DNSSEC deployment, which reduces the opportunity for pharming and other man-in-the-middle attacks. ANZ will encourage registrars and Internet Service Providers to deploy DNSSEC capable resolvers in addition to encouraging DNS hosting providers to deploy DNSSEC in an easy to use manner in order to facilitate deployment by registrants. DNSSEC deployment is further discussed in the context of ANZ’s response to Question 43;

- Prohibition on Wild Carding as required by section 2.2 of specification 6 of the Registry Agreement;

- Removal of Orphan Glue records (discussed below in section ‎‘3.2.8. Orphan Glue Record Management’);



3.2.2. INCREASING REGISTRANT SECURITY AWARENESS

In accordance with ANZ’s commitment to operating a secure and reliable TLD, ANZ will attempt to improve registrant awareness of the threats of domain name hijacking, registrant impersonation and fraud, and emphasise the need for registrants to keep registration information accurate. Awareness will be raised by:

- Publishing the necessary information on the Abuse page of ANZ’s Registry website in the form of videos, presentations and FAQ’s;

- Developing and providing to registrants and resellers Best Common Practices that describe appropriate use and assignment of domain auth Info codes and risks of misuse when the uniqueness property of this domain name password is not preserved.


The increase in awareness renders registrants less susceptible to attacks on their domain names owing to the adoption of the recommended best practices thus serving to mitigate the potential for abuse in the .anz domain.



3.2.3. MITIGATING THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSIVE REGISTRATIONS THAT AFFECT THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF OTHERS

The risk of abuse in the .anz domain has been extensively mitigated and as a direct result is very low. ANZ is committed to ensuring that abuse will not be tolerated. Many of the examples of abusive behaviour identified in ANZ’s Anti-Abuse Policy may affect the rights of trademark holders. While ANZ’s Anti-Abuse Policy addresses abusive behaviour in a general sense, ANZ has also developed specific policies and procedures to combat behaviours that affect the rights of trademark holders at start-up and on an ongoing basis. These include the implementation of a trademark claims service and a sunrise registration service at start-up and implementation of the UDRP, URS and PDDRP on an ongoing basis. The implementation of these policies and procedures serves to mitigate the potential for abuse in the .anz domain by ensuring that domain names are allocated to those who hold a corresponding trademark.

These policies and procedures are described in detail in ANZ’s response to Question 29.



3.2.4. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ALLOWING FOR UNQUALIFIED REGISTRATIONS

ANZ will adopt and impose strict controls over the registration and use of .anz domain names. ANZ will devise and document strict criteria and authority levels which will need to be satisfied before a domain name can be registered for ANZ’s use. To ensure appropriate verification of this function, third party registrar(s) will be appointed to perform the administrative aspects of the registration of domain names in strict compliance with the defined criteria and designated authority levels. Only authorized personnel within ANZ’s organization will be able to request and⁄or authorize DNS changes to be made either by the third party registrar(s) or the registry services provider. The documented criteria and authority levels for domain name registration will ensure multiple, unique points of contact are needed to request and⁄ or approve, update, transfer and⁄ or deal with deletion requests, and will require notification of multiple unique points of contact when a domain name has been updated, transferred, or deleted.

Eligibility requirements for the .anz domain are further explored in ANZ’s response to Question 18.



3.2.5. Registrant Disqualification

As has been described above, the risk of abuse has been extensively mitigated and as a direct result is very low as all domains names may only be registered in the name of ANZ and its affiliates. ANZ is, however, well aware that abusive domain registration has historically attracted a small number of individuals and organisations that engage in high volume registrations, driven by the marginal profitability of individual abusive registrations. Therefore, as specified in ANZ’s Anti-Abuse Policy, ANZ reserve the right to deny registration of a domain name to a Registrant who has repeatedly engaged in abusive behaviour in ANZ’s .anz domain or any other TLD.

Registrants, their agents or affiliates found through the application of ANZ’s Anti-Abuse Policy to have repeatedly engaged in abusive registration will be disqualified from maintaining any registrations or making future registrations. This will be triggered when ANZ’s records indicate that a Registrant has had action taken against it an unusual number of times through the application of ANZ’s Anti-Abuse Policy. Registrant disqualification provides an additional disincentive for qualified registrants to maintain abusive registrations in that it puts at risk even otherwise non-abusive registrations through the possible loss of all registrations.

In addition, name servers that are found to be associated only with fraudulent registrations will be added to a local blacklist and any existing or new registration that uses such fraudulent NS record will be investigated.

The disqualification of ‘bad actors’ and the creation of blacklists mitigates the potential for abuse by preventing individuals known to partake in such behaviour from registering domain names.



3.2.6. RESTRICTIONS ON PROXY REGISTRATION SERVICES

ANZ’s proposed use of the .anz means that all domains names may only be registered in the name of ANZ and its affiliates. This indicates that there is unlikely to be a need to offer proxy registration services. Should however the eligibility criteria for registration of domain names in .anz change, ANZ will adopt the procedure outlined below.

Whilst it is understood that implementing measures to promote Whois accuracy is necessary to ensure that the registrant may be tracked down, it is recognised that some Registrants may wish to utilise a proxy registration service to protect their privacy. In the event that Registrars elect to offer such services, the following conditions apply:

- Proxy registration services may only be offered by Registrars and NOT resellers;

- Registrars must ensure that the actual Whois data is obtained from the Registrant and must maintain accurate records of such data;

- Registrars must provide Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) with the actual Whois data upon receipt of a verified request; and

- Proxy registration services may only be made available to private individuals using the domain name for non-commercial purposes.


These conditions will be implemented contractually by inclusion of corresponding clauses in the RRA as well as being published on the abuse page of ANZ’s Registry website. Individuals and organisations will be encouraged through ANZ’s abuse page to report any domain names they believe violate the restriction on the availability of proxy registrations to individuals, following which appropriate action may be taken by ANZ. Publication of these conditions on the abuse page of ANZ’s Registry website ensures that registrants are aware that despite utilisation of a proxy registration service, actual Whois information will be provided to LEA upon request in order to hold registrants liable for all actions in relation to their domain name. The certainty that Whois information relating to domain names which draw the attention of LEA will be disclosed results in the .anz domain being less attractive to those seeking to register domain names for abusive purposes thus mitigating the potential for abuse in the .anz domain.




3.2.7. REGISTRY LOCK

Certain mission-critical domain names such as transactional sites, email systems and site supporting applications may warrant a higher level of security. Whilst ANZ will take efforts to promote the awareness of security amongst Registrants, it is recognised that an added level of security may be provided to Registrants by ‘registry locking’ the domain name thereby prohibiting any updates at the Registry Operator level. The Registry Lock service will be offered to all registrars who may request this service on behalf of their Registrants in order to prevent unintentional transfer, modification or deletion of the domain name. This service mitigates the potential for abuse by prohibiting any unauthorised updates that may be associated with fraudulent behaviour. For example, an attacker may update name servers of a mission critical domain name, thereby redirecting customers to an illegitimate website without actually transferring control of the domain name.


Upon receipt of a list of domain names to be placed on Registry Lock by an authorised representative from a Registrar, ARI will:

1. Validate that the Registrar is the Registrar of record for the domain names;

2. Set or modify the status codes for the names submitted to serverUpdateProhibited, serverDeleteProhibited and⁄or serverTransferProhibited depending on the request;

3. Record the status of the domain name in the Shared Registration System (SRS);

4. Provide a monthly report to registrars indicating the names for which the Registry Lock service was provided in the previous month.



3.2.8. ORPHAN GLUE RECORD MANAGEMENT

The ARI Managed TLD Registry Shared Registry Service database does not allow orphan records. Glue records are removed when the delegation point NS record is removed. Other domains that need the glue record for correct DNS operation may become unreachable or less reachable depending on their overall DNS service architecture. It is the Registrant’s responsibility to ensure that their domain name does not rely on a glue record that has been removed and that it is delegated to a valid name server. The removal of glue records upon removal of the delegation point NS record mitigates the potential for use of orphan glue records in an abusive manner.



3.2.9. PROMOTING WHOIS ACCURACY

The provision of inaccurate Whois information significantly hampers the ability to enforce policies in relation to abuse in the .anz domain by allowing the registrant to remain anonymous. In addition, Law Enforcement Agencies’ rely on the integrity and accuracy of Whois information in their investigative processes to identify and locate wrongdoers. ANZ and⁄or its affiliates (as defined in this response) will be listed as the sole registrant of all domain names within the .anz domain. ANZ’s clear written policy (which requires the relevant corporate authorisation and approvals to be procured and evidenced for any .anz domain name to be registered for ANZ’s use, and the subsequent verification through a registrar) will ensure thorough pre-verification of all Whois data. Therefore, all Whois information will be complete and accurate at the time of registration. In the event of any change in the Whois contact information for a domain name, that change will be promptly updated in the Whois database.


Additionally, ANZ’s registry services partner ARI will implement a range of measures to promote the accuracy of Whois information in the .anz domain including:

- Random monthly checks: registrants of randomly selected domain names are contacted by telephone using the provided Whois information by a member of the ARI Policy Compliance team in order to verify the phone number and confirm other Whois information. Where the registrant is not contactable by telephone alternative contact details (email, postal address) will be used to contact the registrant who must then provide a contact number that is verified by the member of the ARI Policy Compliance team. In the event that the registrant is not able to be contacted by any of the methods provided in Whois, the domain name will be cancelled following five contact attempts or one month after the initial contact attempt (based on the premise that a failure to respond is indicative of inaccurate Whois information and is grounds for terminating the registration agreement);

- Email reminders: to update Whois information to be sent to registrants every 6 months;

- Reporting system: a web based submission service for reporting Whois accuracy issues available on the abuse page of ANZ’s Registry website;

- Analysis of Registry data: to identify patterns and correlations indicative of inaccurate Whois (e.g. repetitive use of fraudulent details).


Registrants will continually be made aware, through the Registry website and email reminders to update Whois information of the ramifications of a failure to respond to random monthly checks and maintain accurate Whois information. Ramifications include but are not limited to termination of the registration agreement.

The measures to promote Whois accuracy described above strike a balance between the need to maintain the integrity of the Whois service, which facilitates the identification of those taking part in illegal or fraudulent behaviour, and the operating practices of the Registry Operator and Registrars which aim to offer domain names to registrants in an efficient and timely manner.

Awareness by registrants that ANZ will actively take steps to maintain the accuracy of Whois information mitigates the potential for abuse in the .anz domain by discouraging abusive behaviour given that registrants may be identified, located and held liable for all actions in relation to their domain name.



3.3. REACTIVE – IDENTIFICATION

The methods by which abusive behaviour in ANZ’s .anz domain may be identified are described below. These include detection by ARI or notification from third parties. These methods serve to merely identify and not determine whether abuse actually exists. Upon identification of abuse the behaviour will be handled in accordance with section ‘3.4 Abuse Handling’.



3.3.1. DETECTION – ANALYSIS OF DATA

ARI will routinely analyse Registry data in order to identify abusive domain names by searching for behaviours typically indicative of abuse. The following are examples of the data variables that will serve as indicators of a suspicious domain name and may trigger further action by the ARI Policy Compliance team;

- Unusual Domain Name Registration Practices: practices such as registering hundreds of domains at a time, registering domains which are unusually long or complex or include an obvious series of numbers tied to a random word (abuse40, abuse50, abuse60) may when considered as a whole be indicative of abuse;

- Domains or IP addresses identified as members of a Fast Flux Service Network (FFSN): ARI uses the formula developed by the University of Mannheim and tested by participants of the Fast Flux PDP WG to determine members of this list. IP addresses appearing within identified FFSN domains, as either NS or A records shall be added to this list.

- An Unusual Number of Changes to the NS record: the use of fast-flux techniques to disguise the location of web sites or other Internet services, to avoid detection and mitigation efforts, or to host illegal activities is considered abusive in the .anz domain. Fast flux techniques use DNS to frequently change the location on the Internet to which the domain name of an Internet host or name server resolves. As such an unusual number of changes to the NS record may be indicative of the use of fast-flux techniques given that there is little, if any, legitimate need to change the NS record for a domain name more than a few times a month.

- Results of Monthly Checks: The random monthly checks to promote Whois accuracy described above are not limited to serving that purpose but may also be used to identify abusive behaviour given the strong correlation between inaccurate Whois data and abuse.

- Analysis of Cross Validation of Registrant Whois data against Whois Data Known to be Fraudulent.

- Analysis of Domain Names belonging to Registrant subject to action under the Anti-Abuse policy: in cases where action is taken against a registrant through the application of ANZ’s Anti-Abuse policy, ANZ will also investigate other domain names by the same registrant (same name, nameserver IP address, email address, postal address etc).



3.3.2. ABUSE REPORTED BY THIRD PARTIES

Whilst ANZ is confident in its ability to detect abusive behaviour in the .anz domain owing to the robust ongoing monitoring activities, ANZ also recognises the value of notification from third parties to identify abuse. To this end, ANZ will incorporate notifications from the following third parties in its efforts to identify abusive behaviour:

- Industry partners through ARI’s participation in industry forums which facilitate the sharing of information;

- Law Enforcement Agencies through a single abuse point of contact (ANZ’s abuse page on the Registry website, as discussed in detail below) and an expedited process (described in detail in section ‘3.4 Abuse Handling’) for Law Enforcement Agencies; and

- Members of the general public through a single abuse point of contact (ANZ’s abuse page on the Registry website).



3.3.2.1. INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION AND INFORMATION SHARING

ARI is a member of the Registry Internet Safety Group (RISG), whose mission is to facilitate data exchange and promulgate best practices to address internet identity theft, especially phishing and malware distribution. In addition, ARI coordinates with the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) and other DNS abuse organisations and is subscribed to the NXdomain mailing list. ARI’s strong participation in the industry facilitates collaboration with relevant organisations on abuse related issues and ensures that ARI is responsive to new and emerging domain name abuses.

The information shared as a result of this industry participation will be used to identify domain names registered or used for abusive purposes. Information shared may include a list of registrants known to partake in abusive behaviour in other TLDs. Whilst the presence on such lists will not constitute grounds for registrant disqualification, ARI will investigate domain names registered to those listed registrants and take appropriate action. In addition, information shared regarding practices indicative of abuse will facilitate detection of abuse by ANZ’s own monitoring activities.


3.3.2.2. SINGLE ABUSE POINT OF CONTACT ON WEBSITE

In accordance with section 4.1 of specification 6 of the Registry Agreement ANZ will establish a single abuse point of contact (SAPOC) responsible for addressing and providing a timely response to abuse complaints concerning all names registered in the .anz domain through all registrars of record, including those involving a reseller. Complaints may be received from members of the general public, other registries, registrars, Law Enforcement Agencies, government and quasi governmental agencies and recognised members of the anti-abuse community.

The SAPOC’s accurate contact details (email and mailing address as well as a primary contact for handling inquiries related to malicious conduct in the .anz domain) will be provided to ICANN and published on the abuse page of ANZ’s Registry website which will also include:

- All public facing policies in relation to the .anz domain including the Anti-Abuse Policy;

- A web based submission service for reporting inaccuracies in Whois information;

- Registrant Best Practices;

- Conditions that apply to proxy registration services and direction to the SAPOC to report domain names that violate the conditions.
As such, the SAPOC may receive complaints regarding a range of matters including but not limited to:

- Violations of the Anti-Abuse Policy;

- Inaccurate Whois information;

- Violation of the restriction of proxy registration services to individuals.


The SAPOC will be the primary method by which ANZ will receive notification of abusive behaviour from third parties. It must be emphasised that the SAPOC will be the initial point of contact following which other processes will be triggered depending on the identity of the reporting organisation. Accordingly, separate processes for identifying abuse exist for reports by LEA⁄government and quasi governmental agencies and members of the general public. These processes will be described in turn below.


3.3.2.2.1. NOTIFICATION BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF ABUSE

ANZ recognises that Law Enforcement Agencies, governmental and quasi governmental agencies may be privy to information beyond the reach of others which may prove critical in the identification of abusive behaviour in the .anz domain. As such, ANZ will provide an expedited process which serves as a channel of communication for law enforcement, government and quasi-governmental agencies to, amongst other things, report illegal conduct in connection with the use of the .anz domain.

The process will involve prioritisation and prompt investigation of reports identifying abuse from those organisations. ANZ’s steps in the expedited process are summarised as follows:

1. identifying relevant LEA, government and quasi governmental agencies who may take part in the expedited process depending on the mission⁄purpose and jurisdiction of ANZ’s .anz domain;

2. Establishing back channel communication with each of the identified agencies in order to obtain information that may be used to verify the identity of the agency upon receipt of a report utilising the expedited process;

3. Publishing contact details on the abuse page of the Registry website for the SAPOC to be utilised by only those taking part in the expedited process;

4. All calls to this number will be responded to by a member of the ARI Policy Compliance Team on a 24⁄7 (365 days???) basis;

5. Verify the identity of the reporting agency employing methods specific to that agency established during back channel communication (ARIʹs Security Policy has strict guidelines regarding the verification of external parties over the telephone);


6. Upon verification of the reporting agency, ANZ will obtain the details necessary to adequately investigate the report of abusive behaviour in .anz domain;

7. Reports from verified agencies may be provided in the Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) as defined in RFC 5070. Provision of information in the IODEF will improve ANZ’s ability to resolve complaints by simplifying collaboration and data sharing; and

8. The report identifying abuse will then be dealt with in accordance with section ‘3.4 Abuse Handling’.


3.3.2.2.2. NOTIFICATION BY GENERAL PUBLIC OF ABUSE

Abusive behaviour in the .anz domain may also be identified by members of the general public including but not limited to other registries, registrars or security researchers. The steps in this notification process are summarised as follows:

1. ANZ will publish contact details on the abuse page of the Registry website for the SAPOC (note that these contact details are not the same as those provided for the expedited process);

2. All calls to this number will be responded to by one of ANZ’s Policy Compliance Officers;

3. The details of the report identifying abuse will be documented using a standard information gathering template and forwarded to a member of the Policy Compliance Team; and

4. The report identifying abuse will then be dealt with in accordance with section ‎‘3.4 Abuse Handling’.


3.4. ABUSE HANDLING

Upon being made aware of abuse in the .anz domain, whether by ongoing monitoring activities or notification from third parties, the ARI Policy Compliance team will perform the following functions:


3.4.1. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AND CATEGORISATION

Each report of purported abuse will undergo an initial preliminary assessment by the ARI Policy Compliance team to determine the legitimacy of the report. This step may involve simply visiting the offending website and is intended to weed out spurious reports, and will not involve the in-depth investigation needed to make a determination as to whether the reported behaviour is abusive.

Where the report is assessed as being legitimate, the type of activity reported will be classified as one of the types of abusive behaviour as found in the Anti Abuse Policy by the application of the definitions provided. In order to make this classification, the ARI Policy Compliance Team must establish a clear link between the activity reported and the alleged type of abusive behaviour such that addressing the reported activity will address the abusive behaviour.

While ANZ recognises that each incident of abuse represents a unique security threat and should be mitigated accordingly, ANZ also recognises that prompt action justified by objective criteria are key to ensuring that mitigation efforts are effective. With this in mind, [name of ANZ] have categorised the actions that ANZ may take in response to various types of abuse by reference to the severity and immediacy of harm. This categorisation will be applied to each validated report of abuse and actions will be taken in accordance with the table below. It must be emphasised that the actions to mitigate the identified type of abuse in the table are merely intended to provide a rough guideline and may vary upon further investigation.



CATEGORY 1

Probable Severity or Immediacy of Harm – Low

Examples of types of abusive behaviour – Spam, Malware

Mitigation steps -
1. Investigate
2. Notify registrant



CATEGORY 2

Probable Severity or Immediacy of Harm - Medium to High

Examples of types of abusive behaviour – Fast Flux Hosting, Phishing, Illegal Access to other Computers or Networks, Pharming, Botnet command and control

Mitigation steps -
1. Suspend domain name
2. Investigate
3. Restore or terminate domain name

The mitigation steps for each category will now be described:



3.4.2. INVESTIGATION – CATEGORY 1

Types of abusive behaviour that fall into this category include those that represent a low severity or immediacy of harm to registrants and internet users. These generally include behaviours that result in the dissemination of unsolicited information or the publication of illegitimate information. While undesirable, these activities do not generally present such an immediate threat as to justify suspension of the domain name in question. ANZ will contact the registrant to instruct that the breach of the Anti Abuse Policy be rectified. If the ARI Policy Compliance team’s investigation reveals that the severity or immediacy of harm is greater than originally anticipated, the abusive behaviour will be escalated to Category 2 and mitigated in accordance with the applicable steps. These are described below.


3.4.3. SUSPENSION – CATEGORY 2

Types of abusive behaviour that fall into this category include those that represent a medium to high severity or immediacy of harm to registrants and internet users. These generally include behaviours that result in intrusion into other computers’ networks and systems or financial gain by fraudulent means. Following notification of the existence of such behaviours, the ARI Policy Compliance team will suspend the domain name pending further investigation to determine whether the domain name should be restored or cancelled. Cancellation will result if upon further investigation the behaviour is determined to be one of the types of abuse defined in the Anti Abuse Policy. Restoration of the domain name will result where further investigation determines that abusive behaviour, as defined by the Anti Abuse Policy, does not exist. Due to the higher severity or immediacy of harm attributed to types of abusive behaviour in this category, ARI will, in accordance with their contractual commitment to us in the form of SLA’s, carry out the mitigation response within 24 hours by either restoring or cancelling the domain name.


Phishing is considered to be a serious violation of the Anti-Abuse Policy owing to its fraudulent exploitation of consumer vulnerabilities for the purposes of financial gain. Given the direct relationship between phishing uptime and extent of harm caused, ANZ recognises the urgency required to execute processes that handle phish domain termination in a timely and cost effective manner. Accordingly, the ARI Policy Compliance team will prioritise all reports of phishing from brand owners, anti phishing providers or otherwise and carry out the appropriate mitigation response within 12 hours in accordance with the SLA’s in place between us and ARI. In addition, since a majority of phish domains are subdomains ANZ believes it is necessary to ensure that subdomains do not represent an unregulated domain space to which phishers are known to gravitate. Regulation of the subdomain space is achieved by holding the registrant of the parent domain liable for any actions that may occur in relation to subdomains. In reality, this means that where a subdomain determined to be used for phishing is identified, the parent domain may be suspended and possibly cancelled effectively neutralising every subdomain hosted on the parent. In ANZ’s RRA will require that registrars ensure that their registration agreements reflect ANZ’s ability to address phish subdomains in this manner.


3.4.4. EXECUTING AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

ANZ understands the importance of its role as a Registry Operator in addressing consumer vulnerabilities and are cognisant of its obligations to assist Law Enforcement Agencies, government and quasi- governmental agencies in the execution of their responsibilities. As such, ANZ will make all reasonable efforts to ensure the integration of these agencies into its processes for the identification and handling of abuse by, amongst other things:

1. Providing expedited channels of communication (discussed above);

2. Notifying Law Enforcement Agencies of abusive behaviour believed to constitute evidence of a commission of a crime e.g. distribution of child pornography;

3. Sharing all available information upon request from Law Enforcement Agencies utilising the expedited process, including results of ANZ’s investigation;

4. Providing bulk Whois information upon request from Law Enforcement Agencies utilising the expedited process; and

5. Acting on instructions by the agency.
ARI will, in accordance with their contractual commitment with ANZ (in the form of SLA’s), respond to all reasonable requests for information from Law Enforcement Agencies within 12 hours.


It is anticipated that these actions will assist agencies in the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution or punishment of criminal offences or breaches of laws imposing penalties. The relevant agencies are not limited to those enforcing criminal matters but may also include those enforcing civil matters in order to eliminate consumer vulnerabilities.


Upon notification of abusive behaviour by LEA, government or quasi- governmental agencies through the expedited process and verification of the reporting agency, one of the following may occur:

1. The reported behaviour will be subject to preliminary assessment and categorised as described above. The reported behaviour will then be mitigated based on the results of the categorisation. A report describing the manner in which the notification from the agency was handled will be provided to the agency within 24 hours.
OR
2. Where specific instructions are received from the reporting agency in the required format, ARI will act in accordance with those instructions provided that they do not result in the contravention of applicable law. ARI will, in accordance with their contractual commitment to ANZ in the form of SLA’s, execute the instructions of the reporting agency within 12 hours. The following criteria must be satisfied by the reporting agency at this stage:

a. The request must be made in writing to ARI using a Pro Forma document on the agency’s letterhead. The Pro Forma document will be sent to the verified agency upon request.
b. The Pro Forma document must be delivered to ARI by fax.
c. The Pro Forma document must:
i. Describe in sufficient detail the actions the agency seeks ARI to take;
ii. Provide the domain name⁄s affected;
iii. Certify that the agency is an “enforcement body” for the purposes of the Australian Privacy Act 1988;
iv. Certify that the requested actions are required for the investigation and⁄or enforcement of relevant legislation which must be specified; and
v. Certify that the requested actions are necessary for the agency to effectively carry out its functions.
Following prompt execution of the request, a report will be provided to the agency in a timely manner.


Whilst ANZ does not anticipate the occurrence of a security situation owing to its robust systems and processes deployed to combat abuse, ANZ is aware of the availability of the Expedited Registry Security Request Process to inform ICANN of a present or imminent security situation and to request a contractual waiver for actions ANZ might take or have taken to mitigate or eliminate the security concern.



4. RESOURCES

As this function is outsourced to ARI the following is a description, provided by ARI, of the resources that are allocated to performing the tasks required to deliver the services described.

These mechanisms serve to prevent and mitigate abusive behaviour in the .anz domain as well as activities that may infringe trademarks. These responsibilities will be undertaken by two teams. ARI’s Development Team will be responsible for developing the technical platforms and meeting technical requirements needed to implement the procedures and measures adopted to mitigate the potential for abuse, identify abuse and handle identified abuse. ARI’s Legal, Abuse and Compliance Team will be responsible for the ongoing implementation of measures to minimise abusive registrations and other activities that have a negative impact on Internet users.

The responsibilities of both of these teams relevant to the initial implementation and ongoing maintenance, for ANZ’s measures to minimise abusive registrations and other activities that affect the rights of trademark holders, are described in ANZ’s response to Question 29.

All of the responsibilities undertaken by ARI’s Development Team and Legal, Abuse & Compliance Team are inclusive in ARI’s Managed TLD Registry services fee, which is accounted for as an outsourcing cost in ANZ’s response to Question 47. The resource needs of these teams have been determined by applying the conservative growth projections for the .anz domain (which are identified in ANZ’s response to Question 48) to the team’s responsibilities at start-up and on an ongoing basis.



4.1. ARI DEVELOPMENT TEAM

All tools and systems needed to support the initial and ongoing implementation of measures adopted to mitigate the potential for abuse, identify abuse and handle identified abuse will be developed and maintained by ARI. ARI has a software development department dedicated to this purpose which will ensure that the tools are fit for purpose and adjusted as requirements change.

ARI’s Development Team participate actively in the industry; this facilitates collaboration with relevant organisations on abuse related issues and ensures that the ARI Development Team is responsive to new and emerging domain name abuses and the tools and systems required to be built to address these abuses. This team consists of:

- 1 x Development Manager;

- 2 x Business Analysts;

- 6 x Developers; and

- 2 x Quality Analysts.



4.2. ARI LEGAL, ABUSE AND COMPLIANCE

ARI’s Legal, Abuse and Compliance Team will be staffed by six full-time equivalent positions. These roles will entail the following:

A principal responsibility of the Policy Compliance Officers will be handling notifications of abuse through the SAPOC. This will involve managing the expedited process, identifying and categorising suspected abuse according to ANZ’s Anti-Abuse policy and carrying out the appropriate mitigation response for all categorised abuses. When abuse is identified, Policy Compliance Officers will investigate other domain names held by a registrant whose domain name is subject to a mitigation response. They will maintain a list of and disqualify registrants found to have repeatedly engaged in abusive behaviour. Policy Compliance Officers will also be responsible for analysing Registry data in search of behaviours indicative of abuse, reviewing industry lists in search of data that may identify abuse in the .anz domain.

Another key responsibility of Policy Compliance Officers will be implementing measures to promote Whois accuracy (including managing and addressing all reports of inaccurate Whois information received from the web submission service) and verifying the physical address provided by a registrant against various databases for format and content requirements for the region.

Policy Compliance Officers will act on the instructions of verified agencies or Dispute Resolution Providers and participate in ICANN and industry groups involved in the promulgation of policies and best practices to address abusive behaviour. They will escalate complaints and issues to the Legal Manager when necessary and communicate with all relevant stakeholders (registrars, registrants, LEA, general public) as needed in fulfilling these responsibilities. This role will be provided on a 24x7 basis.

Policy Compliance Officers will be required to have the following skills⁄qualifications: customer service⁄fault handling experience, comprehensive knowledge of abusive behaviour in a TLD and related policies, internet industry knowledge, relevant post-secondary qualification, excellent communication and professional skills, accurate data entry skills, high-level problem solving skills, and high-level computer skills.

The Legal Manager will be responsible for handling all potential disputes arising in connection with the implementation of ARI’s Anti-Abuse service and related policies. This will involve assessing escalated complaints and issues, liaising with legal counsel and the Registry Operator, resolving disputes and communicating with all relevant stakeholders (registrars, registrants, Law Enforcement Agencies, general public) as needed in fulfilling these responsibilities. The Legal Manager will be responsible for forwarding all matters requiring determination by the Registry Operator which fall outside the scope of ARI’s Anti-Abuse functions. The Legal Manager will be required to have the following skills⁄qualifications: legal background (in particular, intellectual property⁄information technology law) or experience with relevant tertiary or post-graduate qualifications, dispute resolution experience, internet industry experience, strong negotiation skills, excellent communication and professional skills, good computer skills, high-level problem solving skills.


The team consists of:
- 1 x Legal Manager;
- 1 x Legal Counsel; and
- 4 x Policy Compliance Officers.


For more information on the skills and responsibilities of these roles please see the in-depth resources section in response to Question 31.

Based on the projections and the experience of ARI, the resources described here are more than sufficient to accommodate the needs of the .anz domain.

The use of these resources and the services they enable is included in the fees paid to ARI which are described in the financial responses to ANZ’s application.




** ANZ’S DRAFT REGISTRATION POLICY

1. DOMAIN NAME LICENCES

Upon registration of a Domain Name, the Registrant holds a licence to use the Domain Name for a specified period of time in accordance with the Registry Rules. Domain Names may be registered and renewed for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 years.



2. SELECTION OF REGISTRARS

Registrars eligible to register domain names must meet the following non-discriminatory criteria (in compliance with clause 2.9 (a) of the Registry Agreement):

(i) be an accredited ICANN Registrar;

(ii) demonstrate a level of understanding of the Domain Name registration policies of the Registry;

(iii) have experience of managing the Domain Names of major corporations;

(iv) have proven tools for domain name portfolio management;

(v) have business processes to perform automated validation (and any additional human checks as required by the Registry) of the eligibility of the domain name for registration according to the Domain Name policies of ANZ;

(vi) demonstrate a sufficient level of security to protect against unauthorised access to the Domain Name records;

(vii) demonstrate experience and have appropriate resources in managing abuse prevention, mitigation and responses;

(viii) provide multi-language support for the registration of IDNs;

(ix) comply with any re-validation of its Registry-Registrar agreement at such regular intervals as are determined by the Registry or as required by ICANN from time to time;

(x) meet applicable technical requirements of ANZ; and

(xi) comply with all conditions, dependencies, policies and other requirements reasonably imposed by ANZ, including maintenance of suitable systems and applications that are capable of interacting with the Registry system.



3. ELIGIBLE REGISTRANTS

The Registrant must be:

(i) an Affiliate entity of ANZ; or

(ii) an organisation explicitly authorised by ANZ; or

(iii) a natural person explicitly authorised by ANZ.
If the Registrant does not meet one of the above eligibility criteria, there is no entitlement to register a Domain Name under the .anz gTLD. If the Registrant ceases to be eligible at any time in the future, the Registry may cancel or suspend the licence to use the Domain Name immediately.



4. REGISTRY APPROVAL REQUIREMENT

Registration of Domain Names under the .anz gTLD must be approved by ANZ in addition to meeting all requirements under the Registry Rules. ANZ’s approval for a complete and validly submitted application will be authorised by:

(i) a head of appropriate department as nominated by ANZ (“Authorisation Provider”); or

(ii) an authorised person as nominated by ANZ (“Authorised Person”) and notified to the Registrar from time to time.
The Authorisation Provider will notify the Registrar of its decision.



5. REQUIRED CRITERIA FOR DOMAIN NAME REGISTRATION

An application for Domain Name registration must meet all the following criteria:

(i) availability;
a. the Domain Name is not already registered;
b. it is not reserved or blocked by the Registry; or
c. it meets all Registry’s technical requirements.

(ii) technical requirements;
a. a maximum of 63 characters (after its conversion into the ASCII for IDNs);
b. use of characters selected from the list of supported characters as nominated by the Registry; and
c. any additional technical requirements as required by the Registry from time to time.

(iii) the Domain Name must be consistent with the mission and purposes of the gTLD and consistent with the Domain Name registration policy of ANZ, and include but not be limited to:
a. product name;
b. service name;
c. marketing term;
d. geographic identifier; or
e. any relevant name or term as approved by Authorisation Provider or Authorised Person.

(iv) compliance with all requirements under the Registry Rules: the Registrant must comply with all provisions contained in the Registry Rules.



6. OBLIGATION OF REGISTRANTS

The Registrant must enter into an agreement with the Registrar for Domain Name registration under which the Registrant will be bound by the Registry Rules specified through the Registry-Registrar agreement as amended by the Registry from time to time.

The Registrant must also agree to be bound by the minimum requirements in clause 3.7.7 of ICANNʹs Registrar accreditation agreement.


The Registrant must represent and warrant that:

(i) it meets, and will continue to meet, the eligibility criteria at all times and must notify the Registrar if it ceases to meet such criteria;

(ii) the registration, renewal and use of the Domain Name does not violate any third party intellectual property rights, applicable laws or regulation;

(iii) it is entitled to register the Domain Name;

(iv) the registration and use of the Domain Name is made in good faith and for a lawful purpose;

(v) if the use of registered Domain Name is licensed to a third party,
a. the Registrant must have a licencing agreement with the licensee for the use of the Domain Name that is not less onerous than the obligation of the Registrant contained in the Registry Rules; and
b. where there is a breach of any provisions contained in the Registry Rules by the licensee of the Domain Name, Registry may revoke the Domain Name at its sole discretion.

(vi) it owns or otherwise has the right to provide all registration data (including personal information) for each Domain Name registered and provision of such registrant data complies with all applicable data protection laws and regulations; and

(vii) It has appropriate consent and licences to allow for publication of registration data in the WHOIS database.



7. REGISTRANT CONTACT INFORMATION

The Registrant must provide complete and accurate contact information of the Registrant (in accordance with clause 3.7.7.1 of the ICANN’s Registrar accreditation agreement), including but not limited to the following;

(i) if the Registrant is a company or organisation:
a. name of a company or organisation;
b. registered office and principal place of business; and
c. contact details of the Registrant including e-mail address and telephone number;

(ii) if the Registrant is a natural person:
a. full name of the Registrant;
b. address of the Registrant; and
c. contact details of the Registrant including e-mail address and telephone number.

All Registrant contact information must be complete and accurate. Any changes to such Registrant information must be promptly notified to the Registrar, and no later than one (1) month of such change.



8. REVOCATION OF DOMAIN NAMES

The Registrant acknowledges that the Registry may revoke a Domain Name immediately at its sole discretion:

(i) in the event the Registrant breaches any Registry Rules;

(ii) to comply with applicable law, court order, government rule or under any dispute resolution processes;

(iii) where such Domain Name is used for any of the following prohibited activities (Prohibited Activities):
a. spamming;
b. intellectual property and privacy violations;
c. obscene speech or materials;
d. defamatory or abusive language;
e. forging headers, return addresses and internet protocol addresses;
f. illegal or unauthorised access to other computers or networks;
g. distribution of internet viruses, worms, Trojan horses or other destructive activities; and
h. any other illegal or prohibited activities as determined by the Registry.

(iv) in order to protect the integrity and stability of the domain name system and the Registry;

(v) where such Domain Name is placed under reserved names list at any time; and

(vi) where Registrant fails to make payment to the Registrar for registration, renewal or any other relevant services.



9. USE OF SECOND OR THIRD LEVEL IDNs

In addition to meeting all required criteria for registration of domain names above, an application for an IDN Domain Name must:

(i) comply with any additional registration policy on IDNs for each language;

(ii) meet all technical requirement for the applicable IDN;

(iii) comply with the IDN tables used by the Registry as amended from time to time; and

(iv) meet any other additional technical requirements as required by the Registry.



10. USE OF GEOGRAPHIC NAMES

All two-character labels and country and territory names will be initially reserved in accordance with specification 5 of the Registry Agreement.

Upon approval from ICANN and any other guidelines by applicable governments and ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee, the Registry may release the two-character labels and country and territory names in accordance with ANZ’s response to Question 22 Geographic Names.



11. RESERVED NAMES

The Registry may place certain names in its reserved list from time to time where:

(i) the Registry believes in its sole discretion that use of such names may pose a risk to the operational stability or integrity of the Registry;

(ii) in accordance with ICANN’s specifications contained in the Registry Agreement, guidelines or recommendations;

(iii) there is a risk of trademark infringement or where the name otherwise may cause confusion taking into consideration the mission and purpose of the gTLD; or

(iv) the Registry in its sole discretion decides certain names to be reserved for any reason.



12. ALLOCATION OF DOMAIN NAME

The Registry will register Domain Names on a first-come, first-served basis in accordance with the Registry Rules. The Registry does not provide pre-registration or reservation of Domain Names.



13. LIMITATION ON REGISTRATION ⁄ DOMAIN NAME LICENCES

There is no restriction on the number of Domain Names any Registrant may hold. The Registrant may further licence the use of the Domain Name to any third parties provided that the Registrant enters into an agreement with such third parties on the terms not less onerous than its obligations under the Registry Rules.



14. PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

The Registry will implement all rights protection measures as required by ICANN in clause 2.8 of the Registry Agreement, including the use of the Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) procedure, and Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).



15. TERM OF REGISTRATION ⁄ RENEWAL


INITIAL TERM OF REGISTRATION:

A Domain Name can be registered for a period between one (1) to ten (10) years.



RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION:

(i) The term may be extended at any time for a period between one (1) to ten (10) years, provided that the total aggregate term of the Domain Name does not exceed ten (10) years at any time.

(ii) Upon change of sponsorship of the Domain Name from one Registrar to another, according to Part A of the ICANN Policy on Transfer of Registrations between Registrars, the term of registration of the registered Domain Name will be extended by one year, provided that the maximum term of registration at any time does not exceed ten (10) years.

(iii) The change of sponsorship of the registration of a Domain Name from one Registrar to another, accordingly to Part B of the ICANN Policy on Transfer of Registrations between Registrars will not result in the extension of the term of registration.



CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION:

The Registrant may cancel a Domain Name registration at any time by submitting its request in writing with the Registrar.



AUTO-RENEWAL:

Upon expiry of the Domain Name, the Registry will auto-renew the Domain Name for a one year term (1) year term unless the Registrant submits its intention not to renew the Domain Name.

The Registry will implement the business rules for the renewal of Domain Names documented in appendix 7 of the .com Registry Agreement.



16. TRANSFER OF DOMAIN NAMES BETWEEN REGISTRANTS

Any transfer of a Domain Name between Registrants must be approved by the Registry through the Registrar. The legal heirs of the Registrant or purchaser of the Registrant may request the transfer provided that they meet the eligibility criteria for registration under the .anz gTLD. If the Registrant becomes subject to insolvency or any other proceeding, the administrator may request the transfer. The transferee must provide appropriate documentation as required by the Registry to approve such transfer.



17. CHANGE OF REGISTRAR

If the agreement between the Registry and the Registrar is terminated and if the Registrar has not transferred its Domain Name portfolio to another Registrar, the Registry will notify affected Registrants. The Registrants must select a new Registrar within one (1) month following such notice from the Registry. If the Registrant fails to appoint a new Registrar within the timeframe set out above, the Registry may suspend the Domain Name.

If the Registrant wishes to change the Registrar, the Registrant must obtain the auth-info code from the Registrantʹs current Registrar, and request a transfer through the gaining Registrar in compliance with ICANNʹs Inter-Registrar transfer policy.



18. PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION

By registering a Domain Name, the registrant authorises the Registry to process personal information and other data required for the operation of the .anz gTLD. The Registry will only use the data for the operation of the Registry including but not limited to its internal use, communication with the Registrant, and provision of WHOIS look-up facility.

The Registry may only transfer the data to third parties:

(i) with the Registrant’s consent;

(ii) in order to comply with laws, regulations or orders by a competent public authority and any Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) providers; or

(iii) for a publicly available and searchable WHOIS look-up facility, in accordance with specification 4 of the Registry Agreement.



19. WHOIS

The Registry provides a publicly available and searchable WHOIS look up facility, where information about the Domain Nameʹs status (including creation and expiry dates), and registrant, administrative and the technical contact administering the Domain Name can be found, in accordance with specification 4 of the Registry Agreement.

In order to prevent misuse of the WHOIS look up facility, the Registry requires that any person submitting a WHOIS database query will be required to read and agree to the terms and conditions, which will provide that:

(i) the WHOIS database is provided for information purposes only; and

(ii) the user agrees not to use the WHOIS information to allow or enable the transmission of unsolicited commercial advertising or other communication via email or other methods to the Registrants.



20. PRICING ⁄ PAYMENT

The new gTLD does not charge a separate fee for the Registrar to register domain names, as the gTLD is used only for the specified mission and purpose of ANZ. ANZ shall bear the cost of operating the Registry.

The Registry will provide Registrars with 30 days’ notice of any price change for new registrations, and 180 days advance notice of any price change for renewals in accordance with clause 2.10 of the Registry Agreement.



21. DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The Registrant agrees to be bound by ICANN’s Dispute Resolution Policies in respect of all disputes in connection with the Domain Name.



22. COMPLIANCE WITH CONSENSUS AND TEMPORARY POLICIES

The Registrant agrees to be bound by all applicable consensus and temporary policies as required and mandated by ICANN.



23. DEFINITIONS

Affiliate means in relation to a party any corporation or other business entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control of that party and for the purposes of this definition, a corporation or other business entity shall be deemed to control another corporation or business entity if it owns directly or indirectly:

(i) fifty percent (50%) or more of the voting securities or voting interest in any such corporation or other entity; or

(ii) fifty percent (50%) or more of the interest in the profit or income in the case of a business entity other than a corporation; or

(iii) in the case of a partnership, any other compatible interest equal to at least a fifty percent (50%) share in the general partner.


Domain Name means a domain name registered directly under the .anz gTLD or for which a request or application for registration has been filed with the Registry;


ICANN’s Dispute Policy means the dispute policy currently known as the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) issued and as may be updated from time to time by the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Number (ICANN) and the Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) (see Specification 7 of the Registry Agreement).


Registrar means an ICANN accredited registrar which enters into and is in compliance with the registry-registrar agreement for the TLD, and which provides domain name registration services to Registrants;


Registry means ANZ;


Registry Agreement means the agreement between ANZ and ICANN;


Registry Rules mean:
(i) Registration terms and conditions agreed between the Registry and Registrant for registration of a Domain Name; and
(ii) Registration policies provided and amended by the Registry from time to time.


Registrant means a natural person, company or organisation who holds a Domain Name registration or who has requested or applied for the registration of a Domain Name.


29. Rights Protection Mechanisms


One of ANZ core purposes in operating the .anz domain is to ensure better rights protection for the Applicant, as well as for all Internet users. In particular, ANZ seeks to establish a trusted and reliable, branded platform for those who wish to interact or communicate with the Applicant and with those with which it is affiliated. Therefore, ANZ has a vested and ongoing interest in ensuring that all of its aforementioned policies and procedures are implemented, continually improved and updated and rigidly enforced. ANZ’s proposed use of the .anz domain should, of itself, preclude any abusive registrations from occurring, since all domain names will only be registered in the name of the Applicant and its affiliates in the manner outlined in the response to Question 28. Notwithstanding the above, the Applicant understands the importance of ensuring safeguards are implemented which protect against unqualified registrations.

The applicant has engaged ARI Registry Services (ARI) to deliver registry services for the .anz domain. This response describes the Right’s Protection Mechanisms (RPMs) as implemented in ARI’s Managed TLD Registry Service.



1. INTRODUCTION

ANZ‘s approach to RPMs has been designed to implement and comply with all of the RPMs mandated by the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ and the Registry Agreement.



2. MANDATED START-UP RPMS

2.1. Start-up RPMs Timeline

The timeline for start-up RPMs in our TLD is as follows:

Day 1: Single sunrise round opens

Day 30: Sunrise round closes

Day 31: Sunrise allocation begins

Day 40: Land rush (including trademark claims service) opens

Day 100: Land rush closes

Day 101: Land rush allocation begins

Day 110: General availability begins



2.2. Sunrise Registration Service

ANZ‘s sunrise registration service will provide eligible trademark holders with a 30-day priority period in which to register their trademarks as domain names.



2.2.1. Sunrise Policy Summary and SDRP Summary

This section provides a summary of .anz‘s Sunrise Policy and SDRP.

ANZ acknowledges that, although the .anz domain is intended to be limited exclusively to registrations by the Applicant and its affiliates as defined in the response to Question 28, the gTLD Applicant Guidebook provides that all new gTLDs must provide a sunrise period before general registration of domain names.

ANZ confirms that it will implement a sunrise service pre-registration procedure for domain names prior to the launch of the general registration of domain names. Prior to the Sunrise Period commencing, ANZ will establish and then notify its registry service provider, ARI of the sunrise eligibility requirements for the gTLD. ANZ may register domain names which meet the sunrise eligibility requirements. During this period, ANZ or its registry services provider, will verify whether or not a particular domain name is eligible to be registered. ANZ will set-out within its Sunrise Policy how it will allocate domain names applied for during the sunrise period. Sunrise allocation will start at the end of the 30-day sunrise period.

Additionally ANZ will adopt a Sunrise Dispute Resolution Policy (‘SDRP’) to allow any party to raise a challenge on the four grounds identified within section 6.2.4 of the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ as to the Trademark Clearinghouse. The remedy offered by ANZ SDRP will be cancellation or deletion of a successfully challenged domain name. All registrants in the .anz domain will be required to submit to proceedings under the SDRP. The SDRP will specify that SDRP claims may be raised at any time after registration of a domain name applied for during sunrise and will require that complaints clearly identify the challenger, the challenged domain name, and the ground⁄s upon which the complaint is based, and explain why the challenger believes that the ground⁄s are satisfied.

If a Trademark Clearinghouse (‘TMCH’) service provider is not able to receive challenges directly as part of its undertaking to ‘maintain the SERs, validate and authenticate marks, as applicable, and hear challenges’ (‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ at Trademark Clearinghouse, section 6.2.5), ARI will receive SDRP challenges and communicate these to the SDRP provider. How these policies will specifically be implemented is detailed in the below mentioned implementation plans.



2.2.2. Implementation

2.2.2.1. Sunrise implementation plan

1. Prior to or during ANZ 30-day sunrise period, trademark holders can apply for validation of trademarks by the TMCH and inclusion of validated marks in the TMCH database.

2. ARI will develop a website and make available on that website our Sunrise Policy and SDRP.

3. A trademark holder satisfying the sunrise eligibility requirements set out in ANZ Sunrise Policy will submit to a registrar its application to register a domain name.

4. Registrars will be required to communicate sunrise application information to ARI.

5. ARI will perform standard checks (including IDN validity checks where relevant, reserved and restricted words in accordance with the Registry Agreement, composition requirements, etc.) to ensure that the domain name being applied for is technically valid. An error message will be returned to the registrar if the domain name fails any of these checks. If the domain name passes these hecks, ARI will hold the application for allocation after the close of the 30-day sunrise period.

6. Allocation of sunrise applications will commence upon conclusion of the 30-day sunrise period. As an initial step, ARI will compile a list of applied-for names and reserve these from registration in land rush and general availability.

7. Through an interface with the TMCH, ARI will identify all sunrise applications which constitute an ‘Identical Match’ (as defined at section 6.1.5 of the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’) with a TMCH entry and provide notice to the holders of those trademarks of the filing of a corresponding sunrise registration.

8. Where a single sunrise application exists for a particular domain name, between the end of the sunrise application period and start of the land rush application period ARI will enable the sponsoring registrar to CREATE (using EPP or the SRS web interface) the domain name.



2.2.2.2. SDRP Implementation Plan

1. If a TMCH service provider is not able to directly receive complaints under ANZ SDRP, ANZ will specify in its SDRP the email address to which SDRP filings must be sent. This email address will be monitored by ARI’s Policy Compliance Team.

2. ARI will develop a process of manual or automatic interface with the TMCH to communicate ANZ sunrise eligibility requirements and (if necessary) SDRP challenges received by ARI. This interface will also enable the relevant TMCH Service Provider to notify ARI of successful SDRP challenges.

3. Upon notification from a TMCH service provider of a successful SDRP challenge, ARI will cancel or delete the domain name the subject of the successful challenge.



2.2.2.3. Implementation through Contractual Relationships

The following features of the Sunrise and SDRP implementation plans described above will be executed by the inclusion of corresponding clauses in our RRA, which will require inclusion in registrars’ Domain Name Registration Agreements:

- By making a sunrise application the applicant agrees to purchase the domain name if that name is allocated to the applicant.

- All sunrise applicants must submit to proceedings under the SDRP.



2.3. Trademark Claims Service During Land Rush

Ten days after the day that sunrise allocations begin, a 60-day land rush period will commence during which time ANZ will offer the trademark claims service to eligible registrants. The trademark claims service is a notification service whereby prospective domain name registrants in new gTLDs receive notice of existing trademark rights matching their applied-for domain name and trademark owners receive notice of domain name registrations matching their trademark. In accordance with the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’, our trademark claims service will be supported exclusively by the TMCH and will recognise and honour all word marks falling within the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ (Trademark Clearinghouse section 7.1).



2.3.1. Implementation

2.3.1.1. Land Rush⁄Trademark Claims Service Implementation Plan

1. Prior to or during ANZ 60-day land rush period trademark holders can apply for validation of their trademarks by the TMCH and inclusion of validated marks in the TMCH database. This will enable the provision of notice to land rush applicants of entries in the TMCH and the provision of notice to trademark holders of domain name registrations matching TMCH entries.

2. An applicant will make an application to a registrar for a domain name during the 60-day land rush period.

3. Registrars will be required to communicate land rush application information to ARI..

4. Registrars will be required to interface with the TMCH to determine whether an applied-for domain name constitutes an ‘Identical Match’ with a trademark in the TMCH. If an ‘Identical Match’ is identified, the registrar will provide to the land rush applicant a Trademark Claims Notice in the form prescribed by the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’. Following receipt of this notice a land rush applicant must communicate to the registrar its decision either to proceed with or abandon the application. If the applied-for name does not constitute an ‘Identical Match’ with a trademark in the TMCH, no Trademark Claims Notice will be generated.

5. ARI will utilise the manual or automatic interface it establishes for implementation of the SDRP (described above in ANZ SDRP Implementation Plan) to facilitate reporting by the TMCH of attempts to register domain names that are an ‘Identical Match’ with a trademark (within the scope of the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ at Trademark Clearinghouse section 7.1) in the TMCH database.

6. ARI will perform standard checks (including IDN validity checks where relevant, reserved and restricted words in accordance with the Registry Agreement, composition requirements, etc.) on all land rush applications (irrespective of whether they have generated a Trademark Claims Notice) to ensure that the domain name being applied for is technically valid and an error message will be returned to the registrar if the domain name fails any of these checks. If the domain name passes these checks, ARI will hold the application for allocation after the close of the land rush application period.

7. Allocation of land rush applications will commence upon conclusion of the 60-day land rush applications period. Where a single land rush application exists for a particular domain name, between the end of the land rush application period and start of general availability, ARI will enable the sponsoring registrar to CREATE using EPP or the SRS web interface) the domain name.

8. The registrar will interface with the TMCH to promptly notify relevant mark holders of the registration of a domain name constituting an ‘Identical Match’ to their TMCH entry.

9. Ten days after the start of the land rush allocation period, general availability of domain names to eligible registrants (using first-come, first-served allocation) will commence.



2.3.1.2. Implementation through Contractual Relationships

The following features of ANZ Land rush⁄Trademark Claims Service Implementation Plan described above will be executed by the inclusion of corresponding clauses in ANZ RRA:

- Registrars must comply with the TMCH as required by ICANN and the TMCH Service Provider⁄s.

- Registrars must not in their provision of the trademark claims service make use of any other trademark information aggregation, notification or validation service other than the TMCH.

- Registrars must provide clear notice in the specific form provided by the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ to the prospective registrant of relevant entries in the TMCH.



3. MANDATED ONGOING RPMS

3.1. URS

The URS (Uniform Rapid Suspension) procedure is a new RPM the implementation of which is mandated in all new gTLDs. The URS is targeted at providing a rapid takedown solution to clear-cut cases of trademark cybersquatting. It is intended to have a deterrent effect and reduce the number of disputes under the UDRP.

The URS is intended to supplement and not replace the UDRP, and the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ foreshadows (at ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’, URS sections 8.6 and 13) the likelihood of URS claimants also commencing UDRP claims. For this reason, as part of its planning to implement the URS ANZ has considered in its URS Implementation Plan the potential interaction between URS stakeholders and UDRP stakeholders.

ANZ implementation plan identifies certain aspects of implementation that are not clearly addressed in the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’. For example, the Guidebook does not specify how, from an operational perspective, suspension of a domain name will transform to another domain name status (for example, to transfer of a domain name following a successful UDRP challenge). ANZ assumes that such a status change would only occur upon expiry of the registration, but acknowledge the potential for further developments of the URS policy to allow for change of status as a result of a subsequent UDRP decision.

In addition to identifying such gaps, ANZ URS Implementation Plan identifies our proposed method of addressing these. Furthermore, understanding that a fundamental aim of the URS is expediency, all of the steps in ANZ Implementation Plan below will be undertaken as soon as practical but without compromising security or accuracy.



3.1.1. Implementation

3.1.1.1. URS Implementation Plan

1. As an initial step, ARI will notify to each URS provider an email address to which URS-related correspondence can be sent. On an ongoing basis, ARI will monitor this email address for receipt of communications from URS providers, including the Notice of Complaint, Notice of Default, URS Determination, Notice of Appeal and Appeal Panel Findings.

2. ARI will validate correspondence from a URS provider to ensure that it originates from the URS Provider.

3. ARI will within 24 hours of receipt of a URS Notice of Complaint lock the domain name⁄s the subject of that complaint by restricting all changes to the registration data, including transfer and deletion of the domain name. The domain name will continue to resolve while in this locked status.

4. ARI will immediately notify the URS provider in the manner requested by the URS provider once the domain name⁄s have been locked.

5. Upon receipt of a favourable URS Determination ARI will lock the domain name the subject of the Determination for the balance of the registration period and redirect the name servers to an informational web page provided by the URS provider. While a domain name is locked, ARI will continue to display all of the WHOIS information of the original registrant except for the redirection of the nameservers and (subject to future policy development taking into account the transfer of a URS-locked domain name following a successful UDRP challenge) the additional statement that the domain name will not be able to be transferred, deleted or modified for the life of the registration.

6. Upon receipt of notification from the URS provider of termination of a URS proceeding ARI will promptly unlock the domain name and return full control to the registrant.

7. Where a default has occurred (because a registrant has not submitted an answer to a URS complaint in accordance with the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ at URS section 6.1) and a Determination has been made in favour of the complainant, in the event that ARI receives notice from a URS provider that a Response has been filed in accordance with the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ at URS section 6.4, ARI will as soon as practical restore a domain name to resolve to the original IP address while preserving the domain’s locked status until a Determination from de novo review is notified to ARI.

8. ARI will ensure that no changes are made to the resolution of a registration the subject of a successful URS Determination until expiry of the registration or the additional registration year unless otherwise instructed by a UDRP provider.

9. ARI will make available to successful URS complainants an optional extension of the registration period for one additional year at commercial rates. ANZ understands that this requirement has been based on the provision in the Expired Domain Deletion Policy (3.7.5.7 of the 2009 RAA), under which there is no requirement of notification to the complainant that a name is due to expire. From this we conclude that there is likewise no requirement in the operation of our TLD that ARI notify a successful URS complainant that a name is due to expire.



3.1.1.2. Implementation of the URS through Contractual Relationships

The following features of ANZ URS Implementation Plan described above will be executed by the inclusion of corresponding clauses in ANZ‘s RRA:

- In the event that a Registrant does not submit an answer to a URS complaint in accordance with the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ at URS section 6.1 (default), registrars must prevent registrants from making changes to the WHOIS information of a registration while it is in URS default.

- Registrars must prevent changes to a domain name when a domain is in locked status to ensure that both the Registrar’s systems and Registry’s systems contain the same information for the locked domain name.

- Registrars must not take any action relating to a URS proceeding except as in accordance with a validated communication from ARI or a URS provider.



3.2. UDRP

The UDRP (Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy) is applicable to domain name registrations in all new gTLDs. It is available to parties with rights in valid and enforceable trade or service marks and is actionable on proof of all certain grounds.
The remedies offered by the UDRP are cancellation of a domain name or transfer of a domain name registration to a successful UDRP claimant.
ANZ UDRP Implementation Plan considers the potential overlap between URS implementation and UDRP implementation because ANZ consider it likely that URS complainants will commence UDRP claims as a second recourse or simultaneously.



3.2.1. Implementation

3.2.1.1. UDRP Implementation Plan

ANZ UDRP Implementation Plan focuses on interaction with Registrars because at present there is no interaction between existing gTLD Registry Operators and UDRP providers. On this basis ANZ considers that ARI has two responsibilities in order to facilitate registrars’ implementation of the UDRP.

1. ARI’s Development Team (details about which are provided in section ‘4. RESOURCES’) will maintain awareness of UDRP requirements and be capable of taking action when required and sufficiently skilled and flexible to respond to any changes to UDRP policy arising from future consensus policy reviews.

2. ARI will provide EPP and the SRS web interface to enable registrars to perform required UDRP functions in accordance with the Policy on Transfer of Registrations between Registrars.



3.2.1.2. Implementation of the UDRP through Contractual Relationships

The UDRP is applicable to domain name registrations in all new gTLDs by force of a contractual obligation (Registry Agreement Art. 2.9) on Registry Operators to use only ICANN-accredited registrars, who in turn are contractually required (Registrar Accreditation Agreement, 21 May 2009, at 3.8) to incorporate the UDRP in their Domain Name Registration Agreements.


3.3. Preventing Trademark Infringement in Operating the Registry

ANZ will have absolute control over the registration and use of .anz domain names. Only authorized personnel will be able to register a second level domain name for ANZ corporate use and only authorized personnel will be permitted to make DNS changes. ANZ will require multiple, unique points of contact to request and⁄ or approve, update, transfer and⁄ or deal with deletion requests, and will require notification of multiple unique points of contact when a domain name has been updated, transferred, or deleted. ANZ will have an identifiable and delineated process in place from pre-verification to eventual deletion of a domain name. This process will apply to ANZ and also to any subsidiaries or affiliates (as defined in the response to Question 28 above). Compliance with the policy will be ensured by the appointed Registrar(s). This, in conjunction with ANZ‘s resolution to ensure that abusive use of .anz domain names will not be permitted nor tolerated, means that the scope for abusive use will be very limited.


The responsibility to minimise trademark infringements in the operation of the .anz domain is clearly expressed and imposed upon registries through the new Trademark PDDRP (Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedure), which targets infringement arising from the Registry Operator’s manner of operation or use of its TLD.

ANZ will agree to participate in all Trademark PDDRP procedures and be bound by the resulting determinations (as required under the Registry Agreement), ANZ will also have in place procedures to identify and address potential conflicts before they escalate to the stage of a Trademark PDDRP claim.



3.3.1. Implementation

3.3.1.1. Trademark PDDRP Implementation Plan

1. ARI will notify to the Trademark PDDRP provider⁄s contact details to which communications regarding the Trademark PDDRP can be sent.

2. As described in the response to Question 28, ARI will publish ANZ‘s Anti-Abuse Policy on a website specifically dedicated to abuse handling in our TLD. This website will include information necessary to enable trademark holders to raise concerns regarding infringement of their trademarks and resultant harm caused by ANZ‘s manner of operation or use of the .anz domain.

3. Using the single abuse point of contact discussed in detail in the response to Question 28, a complainant can notify ARI of its belief that that one or more of its marks have been infringed and harm caused by the manner of operation or use of the .anz domain. The complainant will be required to provide the following information:
- Name of the complainant;

- Contact details;

- Trademark name;

- Jurisdiction;

- Registration date;

- Registration number;

- Nature of entitlement to trademark; and

- Explanation of why complainant believes that its mark has been infringed and harm caused by ANZ manner of operation or use of the .anz domain.


4. An ARI Customer Service Representative (CSR) will receive complaints submitted through the single abuse point of contact. The details of the complaint (which will at a minimum include the information above) will be documented using a standard information gathering template and forwarded to a member of ARI’s Policy Compliance Team.


5. Upon receipt of a complaint, the Policy Compliance Team will conduct a preliminary assessment to ensure that a complaint is not spurious. If the Policy Compliance Team determines that a complaint is not spurious, a member of the team will use the contact details provided in the complaint to acknowledge receipt of the complaint and commence investigation of the subject matter of the complaint and good faith negotiations with the complainant in accordance with the ‘gTLD Applicant Guidebook’ at Trademark PDDRP section 7.2.3(d).


6. On an ongoing basis, ARI’s Policy Compliance Team will monitor the email address notified to the Trademark PDDRP provider⁄s for all communications from the Trademark PDDRP provider, including the threshold determination, Trademark PDDRP complaint, complainant’s reply, notice of default, expert panel determinations, notice of appeal and determinations of an appeal panel.


7. In the event that a complaint cannot be resolved and a Trademark PDDRP claim is made, ARI will do the following:

- file a response to the complaint in accordance with Trademark PDDRP policy section 10 (thus avoiding, whenever possible, a default situation);

- where appropriate, make and communicate to the Trademark PDDRP provider decisions regarding the Trademark PDDRP proceeding, including whether to request a three-person Trademark PDDRP Expert Panel (Trademark PDDRP policy section 13.2), request discovery (section 15.1), request and attend a hearing (section 16), request a de novo appeal (section 20.1), challenge an ICANN-imposed Trademark PDDRP remedy (section 21.3), initiate dispute resolution under the Registry Agreement (section 21.4), or commence litigation in the event of a dispute arising under the Trademark PDDRP (section 22); and

- where appropriate, undertake discovery in compliance with Trademark PDDRP policy section 15, attend hearings raised under section 16 if required, and gather evidence in compliance with sections 20.5 and 20.6.


8. ARI will upon notification of an Expert Panel finding in favour of the Claimant (Trademark PDDRP policy section 14.3), reimburse the Trademark PDDRP Claimant.


9. ARI will implement any remedial measures recommended by the expert panel pursuant to Trademark PDDRP policy section 18.3.1 and take all steps necessary to cure violations found by the expert panel (Trademark PDDRP policy section 18.3.2) and notified by ICANN (Trademark PDDRP policy section 21.3).



3.3.2. Implementation of Trademark PDDRP through Contractual Relationships
All new gTLD Registry Operators are bound to comply with the Trademark PDDRP by force of Specification 7, clause 2 of the Registry Agreement.



4. RESOURCES

As this function is outsourced to ARI the following is a description, provided by ARI, of the resources that are allocated to performing the tasks required to deliver the services described.

These responsibilities will be undertaken by two teams. ARI’s Development Team will be responsible for developing the technical platforms and meeting technical requirements needed to implement the RPMs discussed above. ARI’s Legal, Abuse & Compliance Team will be responsible for the ongoing operations of our measures to minimise abusive registrations and other activities that affect trademark rights recognised through the RPMs.

All of the responsibilities undertaken by ARI’s Development Team and Legal, Abuse & Compliance Team are inclusive in ARI’s Managed TLD Registry services fee, which is accounted for as an outsourcing cost in our responses to Question 47. The resources needs of these teams have been determined by applying the conservative growth projections for our TLD (which are identified in response to Question 48 of this application) to the team’s responsibilities at start-up and on an ongoing basis.


4.1. ARI Development Team

All tools and systems used for the transmission and receipt of information related to rights protection mechanisms will be developed and maintained by ARI. ARI has a software development department dedicated to this purpose which will ensure that the tools are fit for purpose and adjusted as requirements change.

ARI will ensure that systems and tools will be compliant with the appropriate processes for dealing with registrars, the TMCH, URS and Trademark PDDRP providers as these processes are defined. ARI has been and will remain active in the formulating of these processes. ARI will use its resources to remain current with the approved measures for exchange of RPM-related material or any other material relevant to RPMs, whether that is during sunrise, land rush or on an ongoing basis. This team consists of:

- 1 x Development Manager;
- 2 x Business Analysts;
- 6 x Developers; and
- 2 x Quality Analysts.


4.2. ARI Legal, Abuse and Compliance Team

ARI’s Policy Compliance Team will be staffed by 6 full-time equivalent positions. These roles will entail the following:

Policy Compliance Officers will be responsible for managing sunrise and land rush applications, supporting the SDRP, trademark claims service, URS, UDRP and Trademark PDDRP, managing communications with the TMCH, receiving, assessing and managing trademark infringement complaints received through the single abuse point of contact, escalating complaints and issues to the Legal Manager when necessary, and communicating with all relevant stakeholders (registrars, registrants, trademark holders, general public) as needed in fulfilling these responsibilities. This role will be provided on a 24x7 basis.

The Legal Manager will be responsible for handling all potential disputes arising in connection with RPMs and related policies. This will involve assessing complaints and issues, liaising with legal counsel and management, resolving disputes and communicating with all relevant stakeholders (registrars, registrants, trademark holders, general public) as needed in fulfilling these responsibilities.


The team consists of:
- 1 x Legal Manager;
- 1 x Legal Counsel; and
- 4 x Policy Compliance Officers.


For more information on the skills and responsibilities of these roles please see the in-depth resources section in response to Question 31.

Based on the projections and the experience of ARI, the resources described here are more than sufficient to accommodate the needs of this TLD.

The use of these resources and the services they enable is included in the fees paid to ARI which are described in the financial responses to this application.


30(a). Security Policy: Summary of the security policy for the proposed registry

We have engaged ARI Registry Services (ARI) to deliver services for this TLD. ARI provide registry services for a number of TLDs including the .au ccTLD. For more background information on ARI please see the attachment ‘Q30a – ARI Background & Roles.pdf’. This response describes Security as implemented by ARI under direction from the registry operator, taking into account any specific needs for this TLD.


1 SECURITY POLICY SUMMARY

ARI operates an ISO27001 compliant Information Security Management System (ISMS) for Domain Name Registry Operations; see attachment ‘Q30a – SAI Global Certificate of Compliance.pdf’. The ISMS is an organisation-wide system encompassing all levels of Information Security policy, procedure, standards, and records. Full details of all the policies and procedures included in the ISMS are included in the attachment to Question 30b.


1.1 THE ISMS

ARI’s ISMS’s governing policy:
– Defines the scope of operations to be managed (Domain Name Registry Operations).
– Designates the responsible parties (COO, CTO and Information Security Officer) for governance, Production Support Group for implementation and maintenance, and other departments for supporting services.
– Requires a complete Risk Assessment (a developed Security Threat Profile for the Service – in this case registry services for the TLD – and a Risk Analysis tracing threats and vulnerabilities through to Risks) and Risk Treatment Plan (each major risk in the Risk Assessment references the Statement of Applicability indicating controls to be implemented, responsible parties, and the effectiveness metrics for each).
– Includes a series of major sub policies governing security, which include but are not limited to:
– ICT acceptable use policy and physical security policies.
– PSG Security Policy which outlines the registry operations policies, the management of end-user devices, classification of networks and servers according to the classification of information they contain, networking, server & database configuration and maintenance guidelines, vulnerability and patch management, data integrity controls, access management, penetration testing, third party management, logging and monitoring, and cryptography.
– Requires ongoing review:
– Of risks, threats, the Risk Treatment Plan, client requirements and commitments, process and policy compliance, process and policy effectiveness, user etc.
– Regular internal and external penetration testing & vulnerability scanning.
– Ad-hoc review raised during normal operations, common sources being change management processes, scheduled maintenance or project debriefs, and security incidents.
– Yearly review cycle which includes both internal and external audits, including external surveillance audits for compliance.
– Additional yearly security controls assessment reviews, which include analysis of the security control implementations themselves (rather than compliance with any particular standard).
– At 24 month intervals, external penetration testing of selected production services.
– Periodic ISO reaccreditation
ARI’s ISMS encompasses the following ARI standards:
– Configuration standards for operating systems, networking devices and databases based on several key publications, including those released by NIST (eg SP800-123, SP800-44v2, SP-800-40, SP800-41) and the NSA, staff testing and experience, and vendor supplied standards.
– Security Incident Classification, which identifies the various classifications of security incidents and events to ensure that events that qualify as security incidents.
– Information Classification and Handling which specifies the information classification scheme and the specific requirements of handling, labelling, management and destruction for each level of classification.


1.2 SECURITY PROCESSES

Processes are used to implement the policies. These include, but are not limited to:

1.2.1 CHANGE MANAGEMENT
This includes change management and its sub-processes for access management, software deployment, release of small changes and scheduled maintenance. This process includes:
– The classification of changes and the flow into sub processes by classification.
– The release and deployment process for change control into production environments, outlining peer review, testing steps, approval points, checklist sets, staging requirements and communication requirements.
– The software release and deployment process with its specific testing and staged rollout requirements.
– The scheduled maintenance process and its various review points.


1.2.2 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
This includes incident management process and its sub-process for unplanned outages. These outline:
– How incidents are managed through escalation points, recording requirements, communication requirements etc.
– The unplanned outage procedure which applies directly to situations where the registry itself or other critical services are unexpectedly offline.


1.2.3 PROBLEM MANAGEMENT
The goal of problem management is to drive long term resolution of underlying causes of incidents. This process centres on finding and resolving the root causes of incidents. It defines escalation points to third parties or other ARI departments such as Development, as well as verification of the solution prior to problem closure.


1.2.4 SECURITY INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
This process deals with the specific handling of security incidents. It outlines the requirements and decision points for managing security incidents. Decision points, escalation points to senior management and authorities are defined, along with evidence-gathering requirements, classification of incidents and incident logging.


1.2.5 ACCESS MANAGEMENT
This process handles all access changes to systems. HR must authorize new users, and access changes are authorized by departmental managers and approved by the Information Security Officer.
When staff leave or significantly change roles, a separation process is followed which ensures all access that may have been granted during their employment (not just their initially granted access) is checked and where appropriate, revoked.
Finally, quarterly review of all access is undertaken by the ISO, reviewing and approving or rejecting (with an action ticket) as appropriate.



2 ARI’s SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE SOLUTIONS

ARI has developed a layered approach to IT security infrastructure. At a high level, some of the layers are as follows:
– DDoS countermeasures are employed outside ARI networks. These include routing traps for DDoS attacks, upstream provider intervention, private peering links and third party filtering services.
– Routing controls at the edge of the network at a minimum ensures that only traffic with valid routing passes into ARI networks.
– Overprovisioning and burstable network capabilities help protect against DoS and DDoS attacks.
– Network firewalls filter any traffic not pre-defined by network engineering staff as valid.
– Application layer firewalls then analyse application level traffic and filter any suspicious traffic. Examples of these would be an attempt at SQL injection, script injection, cross-site scripting, or session hijacking.
– Server firewalls on front-end servers again filter out any traffic that is not strictly defined by systems administrators during configuration as valid traffic.
– Only applications strictly necessary for services are running on the servers.
– These applications are kept up-to-date with the latest security patches, as are all of the security infrastructure components that protect them or that they run on.
– ARI infrastructure is penetration-tested by external tools and contracted security professionals for vulnerabilities to known exploits.
– ARI applications are designed, coded and tested to security standards such as OWASP and penetration-tested for vulnerabilities to common classes of exploits by external tools and contracted security professionals.
– ARI configures SELinux on its production servers. Specific details of this configuration is confidential; essentially any compromised application is extremely limited in what it can do.
– Monitoring is used to detect security incidents at all layers of the security model. Specifically:
– Network Intrusion Detection systems are employed to monitor ARI networks for suspicious traffic.
– ARI maintains its own host-based Intrusion Detection system based on tripwire, which has now undergone four years of development. Specific details are confidential, but in summary, the system can detect any unusual activity with respect to configuration, program files, program processes, users, or network traffic.
– More generic monitoring systems are used as indicators of security incidents. Any behaviour outside the norm across over 1,100 individual application, database, systems, network and environmental checks is investigated.
– Capacity management components of the monitoring suite are also used to detect and classify security incidents. Some examples are:
– Network traffic counts, packet counts and specific application query counts.
– Long term trend data on network traffic vs. specific incident windows.
– CPU, Storage, Memory and Process monitors on servers.
– A second layer of hardware firewalling separates application and middle tier servers from database servers.
– Applications only have as much access to database information as is required to perform their function.
– Finally, database servers have their own security standards, including server-based firewalls, vulnerability management for operating system and RDBMS software, and encryption of critical data.


2.1 PHYSICAL SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE

ARI maintains a series of physical security infrastructure measures including but not limited to biometric and physical key access control to secured areas and security camera recording, alarm systems and monitoring.



3 COMMITMENTS TO REGISTRANTS

We commit to the following:
– Safeguarding the confidentiality, integrity and availability of registrant’s data.
– Compliance with the relevant regulation and legislation with respect to privacy.
– Working with law enforcement where appropriate in response to illegal activity or at the request of law enforcement agencies.
– Maintaining a best practice information security management system that continues to be ISO27001-compliant.
– Validating requests from external parties requesting data or changes to the registry to ensure the identity of these parties and that their request is appropriate. This includes requests from ICANN.
– That access to DNS and contact administrative facilities requires multi-factor authentication by the Registrar on behalf of the registrant.– That Registry data cannot be manipulated in any fashion other than those permitted to authenticated Registrars using the EPP or the SRS web interface. Authenticated Registrars can only access Registry data of domain names sponsored by them.
– A Domain transfer can only be done by utilizing the AUTH CODE provided to the Domain Registrant.
– Those emergency procedures are in place and tested to respond to extraordinary events affecting the integrity, confidentiality or availability of data within the registry.



4 AUGMENTED LEVEL OF SECURITY

This TLD is a SRSU TLD (.brand style) and as such requires security considerations that are commensurate with its purpose. Our goal with this TLD is to use the TLD internally and adequately protect it against unauthorized registrations or modifications to the namespace, without making the internal process too onerous and thus increasing costs. Whilst, due to the SRSU nature, it is relatively straightforward to restrict and enforce restrictions on registrations, the impact of an unauthorised registration can be high, potentially damaging.

The following attributes describe the security with respect to the TLD:
– ARI, follows the highest security standards with respect to its Registry Operations. ARI is ISO 27001 certified and has been in the business of providing a Registry backend for 10 years. ARI have confirmed their adherence to all of the security standards as described in this application. As per recommendation 24 this ensures that the technical implementations do not compromise elevated security standards
– A single Registrar will be nominated for this TLD, facilitating the tightest possible control over Registrant validity enforcement and domain registration restrictions.
– Registrant will only be permitted to make changes to their domain name after a authenticating to their Registrar.
– Registrants will only be able to access all interfaces for domain registration and management via HTTPS. A reputed digital certificate vendor will provide the SSL certificate of the secure site.
– Registrar identity will be manually verified before they are accredited within this TLD. This will include verification of corporate identity, identity of individuals involved ⁄ mentioned, and verification of contact information
– Registrars will only be permitted to connect with the SRS via EPP after a multi-factor authentication that validates their digital identity. This is described further ahead.
– Registrars will only be permitted to use a certificate signed by ARI to connect with the Registry systems. Self-signed certificates will not be permitted.
– The Registry is DNSSEC enabled and the TLD zone will be DNSSEC enabled. This is described in detail in our response to question 43. The following additional requirements will exist for Registrars who want to get accredited to sell this TLD:
– Registrars must support DNSSEC capabilities within its control panels.
– If the Registrar provides Managed DNS services to Registrants within this TLD they must provide DNSSEC for the same. This ensures that DNSSEC is deployed at each zone and subsequent sub-zones at Registry, Registrar and Registrant level as per recommendation 26.
– Registrar access to all Registry Systems will be via TLS and secured with multi-factor authentication as per recommendation 27. This is described in detail in our responses to Question 24 and Question 25.
– Registrant access to all Registrar and Registry Systems will be via TLS and secured with multi-factor authentication as per recommendation 28. This is described in detail in our response to Question 25, Question 27 and Question 29.
– All communication between the Registrar or the Registrars systems and the registry system is encrypted using at least 128 bit encryption which been designated as ‘Acceptable’ till ‘2031 and beyond’ by NIST Special Publication 800-57. This includes the following communication:
– Secure websites and control panels provided by the Registrar to the Registrant.
– Ticketing systems provided by the Registrar to the Registrant.
– Web and EPP interfaces provided by ARI to the Registrars.
– Ticketing systems provided by ARI to the Registrar.
– Any communication between the Registrant, Registrar and Registry that is deemed as critical or contains credentials or sensitive information.
Where these requirements put controls on Registrars these will be enforced through the RRA.



5 RESOURCES

This function will be performed by ARI. The following resources are allocated to performing the tasks required to deliver the services described:
– Executive Management Team (4 staff)
– Production Support Group (27 staff)

ARI has ten years’ experience designing, developing, deploying, securing and operating critical Registry systems, as well as TLD consulting and technology leadership.

As a technology company, ARI’s senior management are technology and methodology leaders in their respective fields who ensure the organisation maintains a focus on technical excellence and hiring, training and staff management.

Executive Management is heavily involved in ensuring security standards are met and that continued review and improvement is constantly undertaken. This includes the:
– Chief Operations Officer
– Chief Technology Officer

A detailed list of the departments, roles and responsibilities in ARI is provided as attachment ‘Q30a – ARI Background & Roles.pdf’. This attachment describes the functions of the above teams and the exact number and nature of staff within.

The number of resources required to design, build, operate and support the SRS does not vary significantly with, and is not linearly proportional to, the number or size of TLDs that ARI provides registry services to.

ARI provides registry backend services to 5 TLDs and has a wealth of experience in estimating the number of resources required to support a registry system.

Based on past experience ARI estimates that the existing staff is adequate to support a registry system that supports in excess of 50M domains. Since this TLD projects 1 domains, 0.00% of these resources are allocated to this TLD. See attachment ‘Q30a – Registry Scale Estimates & Resource Allocation.xlsx’ for more information.

ARI protects against loss of critical staff by employing multiple people in each role. Staff members have a primary role plus a secondary role for protection against personnel absence. Additionally ARI can scale resources as required. Additional trained resources can be added to any of the above teams with a 2 month lead time.

The Production Support Group is responsible for the deployment and operation of TLD registries.
The group consists of:
– Production Support Manager (also the ISO)
– Service Desk:
– 1 Level 1 Support Team Lead
– 8 Customer Support Representatives (Level 1 support)
– 1 Level 2 Support Team Lead
– 4 Registry Specialists (Level 2 support)
– Operations (Level 3 support):
– 1 Operations Team Lead
– 2 Systems Administrators
– 2 Database Administrators
– 2 Network Engineers
– Implementation:
– 1 Project Manager
– 2 Systems Administrators
– 1 Database Administrators
– 1 Network Engineers

ARI employs a rigorous hiring process and screening (Police background checks for technical staff and Australian Federal Government ‘Protected’ level security clearances for registry operations staff).



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